

THE CHRONICLE
OF
PETROS DI SARKIS GILANENTZ

concerning the Afghan Invasion of Persia in 1722,
the Siege of Isfahan and the Repercussions in Northern Persia,
Russia and Turkey

Translated from the original Armenian and annotated

by

CARO OWEN MINASIAN, M. D., M. R. C. S.

With an Introduction and additional Notes

by

LAURENCE LOCKHART, M. A., Ph. D.



IMPRESA NACIONAL
Lisbon — 1959

Preface.

It was my learned friend Dr. Laurence Lockhart, the distinguished historian, who gave me the idea of translating this *Chronicle*.

A few years ago, when he was on a visit to Isfahan, I was fortunate enough to make his acquaintance. He mentioned Gilanentz's *Chronicle*, and we spent some little time discussing it. With some difficulty I subsequently obtained the numbers of the Armenian journal *Krunk* ('Crane')¹ for February and March, 1863, which contained its text. After reading it through, I decided to translate it into English. As certain of the names in the text presented some difficulty, I wrote to Dr. Lockhart, who was then in London, to ask for his help. He was kind enough not only to furnish me with certain details, but also to look up in the British Museum Library the Russian translation of Gilanentz's *Chronicle* by Professor K. Patkanov, a noted Armenian scholar.² As he considered that this Russian translation would be helpful to me, he had a microfilm of it made which he then sent to me.

¹ *Krunk* was published in Tiflis.

² Professor Patkanov's Russian translation, together with some valuable historical information by him, was published in volume xvii of the *Zapiski Imperatorskoi Nauk*, in St. Petersburg in 1870. The title of this translation is: *Дневник Осады Исфагана афганцами, веденный Петросом ди Сарис Гиланенц в 1722 и 1723 гг.* (L. L.).

During the Avicenna millenary celebrations in Persia in 1954, Dr. Lockhart visited me in Işfahan again, and, despite the fact that he was then engaged in the collection of material for his book entitled *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia* (which was published in Cambridge in 1958), he spared enough of his time to read through the translation and to make some corrections, for all of which I am extremely grateful to him. He has never failed to come to my aid.

Furthermore, I am under an obligation to him for his having agreed to write the Introduction to this translation; this introduction gives historical background to the events described, thus enabling the reader to follow the text with greater ease. Lastly, he has added some notes of historical value, which bear his initials, viz. L. L.

Anything needed to clarify the text has been inserted in brackets. Foreign words and names are usually explained in the footnotes; where they occur in the text I have given, wherever necessary, the English equivalent.

In conclusion, I must express my most sincere thanks to the Gulbenkian Foundation for its generosity in providing the funds for the publication of this translation.

Işfahan, 1958.

C. MINASIAN.

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Introduction.

It is at Dr. Minasian's request that I am contributing this Introduction to his English translation of Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz's Chronicle. I am, in fact, very glad to render him this small service, as it gives me the opportunity to pay a tribute to the careful and conscientious manner in which he has carried out his by no means easy task. His achievement is all the more remarkable when one takes into account that he is an extremely busy medical practitioner in Isfahan, with but scanty leisure for labours of this kind.

In my opinion, Dr. Minasian has performed a most useful service in providing an English translation of Gilanentz's interesting and valuable Chronicle, as it will reach a much wider circle, in the west at any rate, than the Russian translation that was made by Professor Patkanov in 1870.¹

The period covered by Gilanentz's Chronicle lasted only from the beginning of March, 1722, to the end of August in the following year, yet, in that comparatively short space of time, Persia suffered an almost unparalleled series of disasters. On the 8th March, 1722, Mahmud of Qandahar, whose father Mir Wais had thrown off the Persian yoke 13 years earlier, had with his Ghalzai tribesmen and some Hazara, and Baluchi auxiliaries, inflicted a crushing defeat on the numerically superior Persian

¹ See p. v above.

army near Gulnabad, a village on the main road to Yazd 12 miles from Isfahan. He had then laid siege to the capital; on its fall in October, 1722, after vast numbers of the inhabitants had died of famine and pestilence, Mahmud forced the inept and unfortunate Shah Sultan Husain to abdicate, and then mounted the throne of Persia himself. Soon after his usurpation of the crown, Mahmud gave orders for a great number of the Safavi ministers and nobles to be massacred. As though these calamities were not enough, Persia was then invaded first by Russia and then by Turkey.

It would lengthen this introduction unduly if one were to set out the many and complex factors that were responsible for the decline and eventual fall of the Safavi dynasty during the period of just under a century following the death of Shah 'Abbas I in 1629. All that need be said here is that the major causes of the decline of the dynasty and the final catastrophe were, first, the deterioration in the character of Shah 'Abbas's successors (with the exception of Shah 'Abbas II), due largely to their having been brought up in the harem, secondly, the control by the court eunuchs over affairs of state,¹ thirdly, the lowering of the morale and efficiency of the Persian army caused partly by neglect and partly by the long period of peace which followed the conclusion of the treaty of Zuhab between Turkey and Persia in 1639, and, lastly, the revival of religious persecution in the closing years of the XVIIth century.²

As I have ventured to state elsewhere,³ there can be no doubt as to the importance of Gilanentz's Chronicle as a historical

¹ Obviously, if there had been a strong monarch on the throne, the usurpation of control by the court eunuchs would have been impossible.

² See my book *The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, Cambridge, 1958, pp. 31-33.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 504-509.

source. In my view, its chief value is the contribution made to it by another Armenian, namely, Joseph (Hovsep) Apisalaymian.¹ Before I had obtained access to Professor Patkanov's Russian translation of Gilanentz's Chronicle, I had come across numerous references to Joseph Apisalaymian, in the despatches of Ange de Gardane, the French Consul at Işfahan,² and in the excellent *Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle*, by Louis-André de La Mamie de Clairac. I also found several memoranda by Joseph in the French and Turkish languages in the archives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs.³ In all these sources, however, it is noteworthy that there is no indication either of Joseph's surname or the fact that he was an Armenian; in fact, he was always described as a Georgian, presumably because he was born in Tiflis. It was only when I read Professor Patkanov's Russian translation of Gilanentz's Chronicle that I discovered Joseph's surname and true nationality.

In my book on The Fall of the Safavi Dynasty I have gathered together the somewhat scanty information that we possess of Joseph Apisalaymian's interesting career,⁴ so I need say little more respecting him here except to draw attention to his first hand account of the tragic scene when the luckless Shah Sultan Husain,

¹ He contributed the material for 82 out of the 133 sections of the *Chronicle*.

² In his capacity as secretary-interpreter to de Gardane, he was of inestimable service.

³ *Affaires Etrangères, Perse*, vol. vi. Professor T. H. Weir published a condensed version, in English, of another Turkish memorandum by Joseph Apisalaymian in his contribution to *A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to Edward G. Browne*, Cambridge, 1922, pp. 480-490. The MS. of this memorandum is in the possession of the University of Glasgow. This account is similar to, but somewhat fuller than, Joseph's memorandum entitled *Mémoire sur la Guerre Civile de Perse*, in the archives at the Quai d'Orsay, *Affaires Etrangères, Perse*, vol. vi, fols. 262-b-308-a.

⁴ Pp. 504-509.

after the fall of Isfahan, was compelled to go to his former palace of Farahabad on the further side of the Zayandeh-rud and there render homage to his uncouth conqueror and surrender his crown to him. Shortly before the city fell Joseph had, at Ange de Gardane's orders, crossed through the Persian and Afghan lines at great risk to himself and had gone to Mahmud's court in order to request the Afghan leader to respect the lives and property of the French residents in the city. As Joseph was not allowed to leave the presence of the Afghan master of the ceremonies while at Farahabad, it thus happened that he was present at the sad scene in the palace.

Although, as I have indicated above, many despatches and memoranda by Joseph Apisalaymian have been preserved, his contribution to Gilanentz's Chronicle is fuller and more interesting than any of them.

The latter part of the Chronicle throws some light on the relations subsisting between the Armenians of Erivan and the local authorities. The Governor-General of Erivan at that time was that curious character Constantine III of Kakheti, who was usually known as Muhammad Quli Khan after he had embraced Islam. He was seldom, however, in Erivan, his place being taken by the Deputy Governor, another Georgian renegade.

In conclusion, I must stress the fact that my contribution to the preparation of this translation of Gilanentz's Chronicle for publication has been only a very modest one, the brunt of the labour having been borne by Dr. Minasian himself. The work, such as it was, proved to be of great interest to me, and I am very glad to have been able to render this small service to my friend, in inadequate return for his many acts of kindness.

L. L.

Prefatory notes.

It will not be out of place here to give a brief description of the principal individuals who were initially responsible for the compilation of this Chronicle, such as the author himself and Archbishop Minas, leaving the others who figure prominently in the text to be described in footnotes as they appear in due course. It has also been deemed relevant to add some preliminary remarks regarding the history of the Chronicle, its style and contents, its first appearance in print, and its translation.

Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz.

It must be admitted that we have very little knowledge of Gilanentz's life; so far as we know, he left no autobiography or diary. Our chief source of knowledge is his own Chronicle; there are also some fragmentary statements, scattered here and there in other works. These fragments chiefly concern Gilanentz's activities in the period following the one covered by his Chronicle. He evidently came into close contact with Archbishop Minas, who was the prelate of the Armenians living in Astrakhan and elsewhere in Russia and who was in close contact with the Russian authorities. The Archbishop had sent Gilanentz to Resht to collect and to transmit to him reliable information; this was to be his primary task. We have reason to believe that Gilanentz may have been entrusted with other missions or commissions¹ in regard to which little knowledge is available.

¹ In section 133 of his *Chronicle*, Gilanentz states that he was expecting to receive some gunpowder from the Archbishop.

The idea of self-determination and freedom had for centuries been gradually spreading among subject nations in many parts of the world. Armenia was no exception to this social and progressive movement; this was particularly the case with regard to the portions of this nation in Caucasia. This section of the Armenian nation had given evidence of its national reawakening by a determined movement for freedom.¹

These activities were in full swing when Gilanentz like several other convinced revolutionaries, plunged into the movement with the object of fighting for the liberation of his nation in co-operation with the Russians. They turned to Russia as she was a Christian power and their near neighbour; she had, moreover, professed herself to be the liberator of the Christians in that part of the world. It was therefore natural that Gilanentz should turn to Russia; it was a period in which the Christians, particularly in Caucasia, were in a serious plight, groaning under the yoke of servitude and being ruthlessly oppressed. Insecurity, pillage and murder were often their lot at the hands of their Muslim oppressors. No attempt was made by the Persian government to check the activities of the wild and fanatical tribes such as the Lezgis, who were wont to descend upon and sack the Armenian villages.

At the outset Gilanentz had a handful of men under his orders at Resht; they were functioning there as an independent unit. The information that he was able to gather and send to Archbishop Minas must have been of great importance to the Russians for the shaping of their plans in regard to northern Persia.²

¹ It was natural that the Armenians, being so oppressed by the Persians and Turks, should turn to Russia, the nearest Christian power, for help. In fact, there was a definite movement amongst many of the Armenians for union with Russia. In this connection, see P. T. Arutunian, *Освободительное Движение Армянского Народа в Первой Четверти XVIII Века*, Moscow, 1954. (L. L.).

² Peter the Great had for long been harbouring designs on northern Persia. His aims had been purely commercial at first, but as time went on and the decadence of the Şafavi state became more and more manifest, he began to envisage an actual occupation of part of the country. With this end in view he sent not only the Volynsky diplomatic

Gilanentz knew that his chief, the Archbishop, was in close contact with the Russians, but it is highly doubtful whether he was fully aware of the extent and concealed nature of these ties.

Here it must be stated in parenthesis that, while the Armenians, on the one hand, wished to take advantage of the existing circumstances to utilise Russian influence and power for the liberation of their nation, the Russians, on the other hand, intended to use the Armenians for their own ends in pursuance of their far-reaching general policy with regard to Persia and Turkey. Although these objectives of the Armenians and Russians were by no means identical, there was no reason why they could not have worked together efficiently and so have derived mutual advantage.

We know from section 133 of Gilanentz's Chronicle that he was in the habit of sending lengthy reports to Archbishop Minas for transmission to the Russian authorities, but, except for the Chronicle itself, no copies of these reports are available. The little that we know of them is contained in some fragmentary statements in the same section of the Chronicle. It is highly probable that he sent other reports to the Archbishop of which no record remains. Events were moving swiftly at that time, and it is a safe assumption to say that he must have passed on promptly any information of importance that came to his ears.

Some little time after he had sent his Chronicle to the Archbishop, Gilanentz formed a company of volunteers which became known as the Armenian Squadron. This squadron co-operated with the Russians in their military activities in northern Persia which had begun in the summer of 1722. We are told that Gilanentz paid the hundred horsemen who formed this squadron out of his own pocket. Petros was eventually killed in action, but his squadron continued to exist, under the command of Lazar Khachaturian.¹

mission to Persia in 1715, but also army officers, consular officials and merchants to report on conditions in Gilan and the other northern provinces. Peter had also the more laudable intention of protecting the Christian inhabitants of those regions, to whose appeals for help he by no means turned a deaf ear. (L. L.).

¹ According to Arutunian, *op. cit.*, p. 213, this squadron attained a strength of 600. (L. L.).

This leader, who was also known as Lazar Christaphorov, eventually reached the rank of General in the Russian army. Another Armenian patriotic leader who served in this squadron was Avan (Hovannes) Yüzباشi, to whose activities subsequent reference will be made.¹

To judge from the style and manner of composition of his Chronicle, Gilanentz was possessed of some education, but could not be described as a learned man. He must have known or been acquainted with a number of languages besides Armenian. He was an acute observer; besides being possessed of sound intuition and foresight, he had a natural talent for calculation and criticism.

As regards Gilanentz's character, he was a man of firmly-held ideas. He could not be bribed, and he was a straightforward and conscientious worker and an influential leader.² He had whole-heartedly espoused the national ideal of liberty and independence, for which he eventually sacrificed his life.

Archbishop Minas Tigranian.³

Archbishop Minas Tigranian was a prominent figure in Armenian affairs at the close of the XVIIIth century and in the earlier part of the succeeding one. On April 29th/May 10th, 1699 he was selected by the Armenian princes and maliks in Caucasia to accompany the famous Armenian Israel Orii to submit the Armenian case to Peter the Great, as is stated in

¹ See Leo, *Haioz Patmuthun* («History of Armenia»), Erivan, 1946, vol. III, pp. 663-664.

² This description of Gilanentz's character is based partly on his own work and partly on the contents of a letter an Armenian friend in Gilan wrote to Archbishop Minas in 1725, stating *inter alia*: «Many a time the Muhammadans offered him high positions (over) whole districts if only he would resign from our service (to Russia), but Petros refused these offers.»

³ The Archbishop was usually known as Minas Vardapet. The word *vardapet*, which is derived from the Pahlavi roots *vapda*, meaning 'work', 'teaching' or 'exercise', and *pet*, meaning 'master' or 'chief', is used in Armenian in the sense of 'doctor', 'learned person' or 'teacher'; in ecclesiastical usage it means 'archimandrite'. Gilanentz used the word sometimes with the first meaning and sometimes with the second.

an original document that has been preserved.¹ In the long petition to the Tsar we read:²

We unanimously elected Minas vardapet (archimandrite), the Abbot of this, St. Jacob's, monastery and our confessor, and sent him with Paron (Lord) Israel, who assuredly and truly knows everything concerning our affairs. Whatever Paron Israel and Minas the vardapet may negotiate with your Imperial Majesty will be acceptable to us all.

Minas had been Orii's friend and close collaborator for the whole of the latter's career (he died in August, 1711 at Astrakhan); after Orii's death, he continued his work, striving hard to free the Armenians from the oppression and tyranny of the Muslims. Orii took Minas with him to Europe. After several years spent in negotiations in central Europe and Russia, they returned to Russia. In 1707 Orii left Moscow with a large suite on his mission to Shah Sultan Husain in Isfahan, leaving Minas, however, behind. Orii used to send his reports to Minas, who, in turn, passed them on to Peter the Great.³ In 1714 Minas submitted to Peter a plan for taking the Armenians under Russian protection. In 1716 he was consecrated Archbishop of all Armenians resident in Russia by Esai, the Catholicos of the Aqvan (Albanian) Armenians, in order to enable him to pursue his activities with greater authority as prelate of the Armenians in Russia, as well as the representative of the Aqvan Patriarchate, that is, the institution which had then embarked on the task of organising the political activities for the national reawakening of the Armenians.

Minas's headquarters were usually at Astrakhan, where he carried on his work tirelessly among the Caucasian Armenians. He also tried, but without success, to unite with the Georgians in a joint endeavour to liberate all the Christians in Caucasia. Minas, being the moving spirit of the movement, had so impressed the Catholicos Esai that he agreed to be its leader.

¹ Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 526.

² *Ibid.*, p. 528.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 581-582.

Minas accompanied the Russian army when it set out on its march to Darband in August, 1722. Gilanentz was then in Resht with his handful of men collecting information for the Archbishop.¹

Minas retained his office as prelate until an advanced age. At the end of his career, in 1740, his health had broken down and he was utterly disappointed and quite destitute. He asked the Russian Government for a pension, and embraced the Orthodox faith. What happened to him subsequently is not known.²

Contents of the «Chronicle».

The subject matter of the Chronicle consists of data concerning the events of 1722 and the following year up to the beginning of September, thus covering the Afghan invasion of Persia and its immediate repercussions in Russia and Turkey.

As Gilanentz had his headquarters in Resht, he was able to maintain contact with many persons who had escaped from the areas overrun by the Afghans and had reached Gilan. Besides Joseph Apisalaymian, other reliable informants were Joseph (Hovsep), the son of Sahijan, the Archimandrite Mekertich, and Thoros. Gilanentz listened patiently to all that they had to say, and recorded their accounts without any exaggeration, a practice unfortunately rare among Oriental chroniclers. He compared their accounts, checking one against another, rechecked them and finally arranged them carefully and methodically in separate sections, with no irrelevant additions of his own. If he came upon any doubtful or obscure reports, he would frankly describe them as such, pending verification. Whenever they turned out to be accurate, he would duly record the fact in the appropriate place. His Chronicle has no heading as such (he never aspired to be an author) and is actually in the form of a long letter to Archbishop Minas. It is divided into 133 sections under dates, recorded as the information reached him. It was originally addressed to the Archbishop as a kind of general report. He handed a Russian translation of it to Brigadier Levashov, the Russian commander in Gilan at that time.

¹ See section 133 of the text.

² Leo, *op. cit.*, p. 665.

Gilanentz's presentation of his data shows that he had taken every care to avoid vague statements and that, so far as he could, he limited himself to facts. In consequence, the contents of his Chronicle agree closely with the reports of other contemporary observers and recorders.

We may divide his Chronicle into two main parts. The first part is concerned with events which occurred for the most part in Isfahan, the capital of the Šafavis, while the second part deals with happenings in the north, that is, in Trans-Caucasia and the neighbouring region in Turkey.

After referring to the Afghan invasion and to the battle of Gulnabad¹, Gilanentz provides very valuable and detailed information regarding the long siege of Isfahan, the surrender of the city, Maḥmud's treatment of Shah Sulṭān Husain and the royal family, the massacre of the princes and nobles, the unfair treatment of the Armenians as a subject nation both by the Persians and the Afghans. He has recorded the contributions and fines which Maḥmud levied on the Armenians of Julfa, the English, Dutch and French East India Companies and on local merchants and others in Isfahan and also in Qazvin. In the second portion of his Chronicle, Gilanentz gives details of the persecution of the Armenians in Caucasia and Trans-Caucasia by both the Persians and the Turks, their treatment of the Supreme Patriarch, the massacre of the Armenians of Qapan, the deeds of Vakhtang, the Georgian leader, and of Constantine (Muḥammad Quli Khan) of Kakheti and his deputy in Erivan. He also describes the Turkish invasion. Likewise of interest and value is the information which he gives of Tahmasp Mirza, the heir-apparent and eventual successor of Shah Sulṭān Husain.² Moreover, he sheds some light, though rather indirectly, on the antagonism between the Shi'a and the Sunnis and on the policy of the Russians and Turks in regard to Persia.

¹ This battle was fought on the 8th March, 1722. Despite their great inferiority in numbers, the Afghans and their auxiliaries heavily defeated the Persian army which fled in confusion from the field, leaving the road to Isfahan open to the invaders (L. L.).

² Tahmasp proclaimed himself Shah at Qazvin on learning of his father's abdication, but he did not become both *de facto* and *de jure* Shah of Persia until after the defeat and flight of Ashraf, Maḥmud's successor, in December, 1729. (L. L.).

History of the Document.

Gilanentz's Chronicle was first published in the Armenian journal *Krunk* in its numbers for February and March, 1863, with an introduction by 'H. P.' (Hovsep Pondoyantz), a prominent contributor to the journal on historical subjects. We learn from this introduction that the manuscript of the *Chronicle* was sent to the journal by Hovannes Hakhverdiantz, a brother of the well-known scholar, Dr. Gevorg Hakhverdiantz.¹ Dr. Gevorg had, it is said, obtained the manuscript from Prince Hovannes Zakarian Arqthuniantz, a brother of Prince Moses Arqthuniantz, a well-known general in the Russian army. The manuscript had reached Prince Hovannes from his cousin the Catholicos Hovsep who, before his consecration, had been Archbishop of the Armenians in Astrakhan and other parts of Russia. The Catholicos had apparently obtained the manuscript from Archbishop Minas Tigranian, to whom Gilanentz had originally sent it.

Pondoyantz further states that this manuscript appears to be only a copy of the one actually written by Gilanentz.² He said later in his introduction that the *Chronicle* had been translated into Russian, but his wording, unfortunately, is such that it is not clear whether he is referring to the Russian translation which Gilanentz handed to Brigadier Levashov or whether it was another translation.³

Gilanentz's Style.

Gilanentz's epistolary style is peculiar to himself; it is not the ordinary dialect of the Julfa Armenians of the XVIIth or XVIIIth century, in which, *inter alia*, certain Armenians words are used in

¹ Dr. Gevorg Hakhverdiantz was a keen collector of Armenian Mss. He owned the oldest Gospel in Armenian, dated A. D. 887, which he presented to the Moscow Lazarev Institute of Oriental Studies. This Ms. is usually known as the «Moscow Armenian Gospel».

² Pondoyantz suggested that steps should be taken to find the original document.

³ According to Pondoyantz, this Russian translation is in the *Moskovski Archiv Gosudarstvennoi Kollegi Inostrannikh Diel*, vol. 1, pp. 326-379, where much valuable material relating to the history of Armenia can be found.

quite a different sense from the accepted meaning in common use. He has used words and idioms drawn from at least six basic languages, namely, Armenian, Persian, Turkish, Russian, Georgian and Arabic and their respective colloquialisms; these are intermixed to such an extent as to form expressions of his own, and are most difficult to follow; they are perhaps understandable only to those who have a sound knowledge of the Julfa dialect and of the languages mentioned above. He is peculiar too in his Armenianisation of foreign words and phrases, and it would be incorrect to say that he wrote in the usual old local form of the Julfa dialect. Apparently, the reason for this was that he had travelled and lived in a number of countries or, alternatively, had lived in close contact with people of these various foreign nations.

Wording and Printing of the Manuscript.

Certain words in the manuscript have obviously been misread and therefore wrongly printed. For example, the word **քաղաքէն** (kaghaken) meaning 'of the town' appears in print as **քոսլաքէն** (koslaken) (that it is not a typographical error is shown by the third footnote on page 13). One cannot help thinking that such errors have made certain passages obscure in meaning. I have done my best to solve these problems as far as possible. There are also a number of misprints, some of which were due to the wrong decipherment of letters, while others were caused by carelessness.

The Armenian Footnotes in the Printed Text.

In each section there are footnotes which give the meaning of unusual and difficult words and brief explanations of the names of some of the places. In preparing these footnotes, Pondoyantz states in his introduction that he had the help of a certain Carapiet Emin, an Armenian in the Russian Customs service, who knew Persian and who 'had not forgotten the language of his childhood', namely, the Julfa dialect. He also had the assistance of Emin Eminian, a nephew of Carapiet Emin, who after living in Calcutta, where he had acquired a knowledge of English, had gone to Tiflis. There are, unfortunately, a number of mistakes in these explanatory footnotes.

Some Notes on my Translation of the Text.

*In translating this Chronicle, I have adhered strictly to the text, and I have endeavoured to reproduce the meaning as faithfully as possible, which does not always make for easy reading, I have, however, always endeavoured to make the English clear. I do not believe that 'clothing the author's mind with graceful expressions' or adding beauty to the language, when it might make it appear different from what the author had actually meant can be excused in works of this nature, even though his words or expressions may seem immature in comparison with modern usage. To take such action would be 'paraphrasing instead of translating', as E. Spelman, the translator of Xenophon's *Ciro-paedia*, very rightly expressed it over a century ago when referring to Alexander Pope's remarks on poetic translations. Historical facts have often been distorted and vitiated by such renderings, and I have therefore tried to avoid them.*

It must be stated that my task has not been an easy one. The following points have added to the difficulties of this translation:

- (I) *The peculiarity of the author's language, which, as already pointed out, is not the ordinary Julfa dialect of Armenian.*
- (II) *The lack or non-observance of definite grammatical rules by the author.*
- (III) *Errors arising from misreading and, in some cases, misprints in the text.*
- (IV) *Obscurities due mostly to the above causes, together with omissions either in the manuscript copy in the hands of the editors of Krunk or omissions in the printing (which are less likely).*
- (V) *Errors and inaccuracies in the printed footnotes.*

I have compared my translation with Professor Patkanov's Russian version and this latter with the Armenian printed text almost word for word. I found that Professor Patkanov has, unfortunately, omitted several foreign words and has wrongly translated some other words and expressions. The same remark applies to the figures. The author used capital letters instead

of numerals throughout the text, and it is most surprising that Professor Patkanov, has mistranslated them on several occasions. I am, however, indebted to him for giving the correct form of the word ԲՈՐԴԱՅԴԵՐ (Borqayder), which occurs in the short preamble. I could not discover what this word meant until Dr. Lockhart found it given as Бригадѣ in Patkanov's Russian text and gave me its true meaning. I have also translated a few of Patkanov's footnotes which he had taken from Russian sources; I have given due acknowledgement in all such cases. I may add that, after comparing Patkanov's translation with the Armenian printed text, I am inclined to think that he had perhaps also used, and for the most part relied on, the previous Russian translation which Pondoyantz mentioned.

In conclusion, I may say that I know of no translation of Gilanentz's Chronicle in any other language.

C. MINASTIAN.

Translation of Gilanentz's Chronicle.

In the Name of God.

To His Grace the Spiritual Father and Learned Archbishop Minas.
Resht, 22nd August/2nd September, 1723.¹

I beg to submit to you the following information regarding the occurrences in this country, numbered separately and in due order. I have also had this written in Russian and have handed it over to the Brigadier.²

1. On the 31st July/11th August, Joseph (Hovsep), the son of Sahijan of Hamadan, came to this town. He said: «I have been away from Hamadan for one month; while I was there, an Armenian arrived from Baghdad who reported that much ammunition had reached it from Constantinople; no troops, however, had come, and there was no word of any being sent. The Pasha of Baghdad,³ who had heard of the arrival of Russian troops in Gilan,⁴ had had the ruined portions of the fort of Baghdad repaired, because he was much afraid of the Russians.»

¹ As Gilanentz's dates are all Old Style, the New Style dates have also, for the sake of convenience, been given in each case.

² The Armenian text is corrupt here; it gives this word as *բորղայդեր* (*Borqayder*). Professor Patkanov correctly transcribes this word as *Бригадир*. The Brigadier in question was Vasili Yakoblevich Levashov, who took over the command of the Russian forces in Gilan in March, 1723 (see Butkov's *Материалы для новой Истории Кавказа с 1722 по 1803 г.*, vol. 1, p. 43).

³ Hasan Pasha. (L. L.).

⁴ Colonel Shipov, with two battalions of Russian troops, occupied part of Gilan in November, 1722. He remained in command until the arrival of Brigadier Levashov with reinforcements in the following March. (L. L.).

2. The above-named Joseph stated that when he reached Qazvin the inhabitants were saying: «Our *Sardar* (commander) has fled from here and we are left without a master. What is our fate to be? When the Afghans approach, the only thing that we can do in the face of increasing danger is to write to the Russian commander in Resht and ask him to take us under his protection, and (say) that we have to become Russian subjects.»¹

3. On the 2nd/13th August two Shamakhi Turks reached Resht from the Shah of Tabriz² as couriers; (they were) on their way to the Vizier of Timijan.³ These two men said that Wakhtang Khan⁴ and the Viceroy (*Vali*) of Kakheti, Muḥammad

¹ The literal translation of the last few words of this sentence is: 'and that we shall serve the Russians'.

² The 'Shah of Tabriz' was Tahmasp Mirza, the third son of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain. He had escaped from Iṣfahan during the siege and had gone to Qazvin; when he heard of the fall of Iṣfahan and of his father's abdication, he proclaimed himself Shah. Shortly afterwards, the Afghans forced him to leave Qazvin in haste and go to Tabriz. Almost immediately after these two couriers had left Tabriz for Resht, Tahmasp, in view of the Turkish threat to Tabriz, had hurriedly left for Ardabil. (L. L.).

³ Timijan is a village in Gilan situated between Langarud and Lahijan.

⁴ Wakhtang VI (who was also known by his Muḥammadan name of Ḥusain Quli Khan) was born in 1675. From 1703 to 1711 he ruled Kartli as regent and from 1711 to 1714 as King; during the latter period he was also *Vali* (Viceroy) of Georgia. In 1714 he was deposed in favour of his brother, as he had refused to turn Muslim. He was reinstated as King and *Vali* in 1719 on (nominally) embracing Islam. Enraged by the refusal of his suzerain Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain to allow him to crush the predatory Lezgis, he refused to advance to the relief of Iṣfahan when it was besieged by the Afghans. Meanwhile, he had been in communication with Peter the Great, in whom he hoped to find a protector for himself and his people. Largely through the machinations of his rival Constantine III of Kakheti (also known as **Muḥammad** Quli Khan), he was, in 1723, once more deprived of his throne and viceregal status. Peter the Great's failure to support him during his invasion of Persia had disastrous consequences for Wakhtang, who eventually had to seek sanctuary in Russia, where he died in 1737. He was an excellent ruler and legislator and was the compiler of a code of laws. He likewise had literary attainments, having in 1712 published, with an elaborate commentary, the well-known poem

Quli Khan,¹ had made peace with each other and that they and their troops had advanced on Erivan. Near that town there were four Turkish Pashas with their forces. They gave battle to three of these Pashas and killed many of their men; the remainder ran away. One of the Pashas, however, had so strongly fortified his position that they had not been able to enter it.²

4. Thoros, the son of John (Hovannes) of Julfa, who reached Resht on the 3rd/14th August, said: «I was in Erzurum when the news arrived that four Pashas had marched on Tiflis and had occupied it, and that they were pursuing Wakhtang Khan with a view to capturing him. For three days there were illuminations³ in Erzurum, and guns were fired. A few days later the news came that Wakhtang had returned with a large number of troops and had attacked and heavily defeated the Turks. The Turkish soldiers who had fled (from the battlefield) were return-

by S. Rust'haveli which, two centuries later, Miss M. S. Wardrop translated into English under the title of *The Man in the Panther's Skin*. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

¹ Constantine III (Muhammad Quli Khan) of Kakheti, though a sincere patriot, was a rash, pitiless and unscrupulous man. Having fervently embraced the Shi'i form of Islam, in 1723 he induced the pliant Tahmasp Mirza to make him King of Kartli and *Vali* of Georgia in place of Wakhtang. He also induced the prince to make him Governor-General of Erivan; his deputy *ḡwǰḡp* (nayib, from the Arabic *na'ib*) was likewise a renegade Georgian. He was strongly opposed to Wakhtang, partly on dynastic grounds and partly because he knew or suspected that his rival wished to place Georgia under the suzerainty of Russia. As a staunch Shi'i, he was violently opposed to the Sunni Turks, at whose hands he eventually lost his life. He behaved brutally to the Armenians, many of whom he massacred, and he persecuted their Catholicos at Echmiadzin (in this connection, see sections 104 and 109 of the *Chronicle*). (L. L.).

² This account of the opening stages of the Turkish invasion of north-western Persia is very inaccurate. In June, 1723, the Turks, with Wakhtang's assistance, forced Constantine III to surrender Tiflis, which he had seized. Wakhtang did not subsequently attack and defeat the Turks. (L. L.).

³ In the text the word is *donama*, a corruption of the Turkish *donanma*; in the footnote the meaning is wrongly given as 'besieged'. (C. O. M., L. L.).

ing to Erzurum in (bodies of) one hundred and two hundred strong. When we reached Bayazid, we actually saw them retreating. As we entered Tabriz, we heard the same news. A courier who arrived in Tabriz from Georgia confirmed what has been stated above.»

5. On the 28th July/8th August (1723), Joseph Apisalaymian of Tiflis, who is an Armenian by birth and who has embraced the Catholic faith,¹ fled from Işfahan by way of Hamadan. He was interpreter to the French Company.² On arrival in Resht, he informed us how the Afghans had taken Işfahan. Maḥmud Khan, the son of Mir Wais, the Afghan,³ had on the 18th February/1st March, 1722, reached Varzana,⁴ which is 16 *farsakhs* or 80 *versts*⁵ from Işfahan.

6. The Arab commander (*sardar*)⁶ had, on the same day, sent a courier (*chapar*) to the Shah in Işfahan, informing him: «It is certain that Maḥmud is marching on Işfahan; immediate measures must be taken.»

7. On hearing that Maḥmud was undoubtedly advancing, the Shah ordered his nobles to have ready all the leaders (*omara*),

¹ It is probable that Joseph Apisalaymian became a Roman Catholic while he was being educated in France. (L. L.).

² Joseph Apisalaymian was secretary and interpreter to Ange de Gardane, the French Consul at Işfahan; it was part of Gardane's duties to look after the interests of the Compagnie Française des Indes. (L. L.).

³ Maḥmud had previously, in the late summer of 1719, invaded Persia with his Ghalzai tribesmen and had captured the town (but not the citadel) of Kirman. When Maḥmud invaded Persia for the second time, Luṭf 'Ali Khan had been disgraced and his army disbanded, so he met with little opposition.

⁴ This information is confirmed by the *Dagregister*, a day to day record of events kept by the Chief Merchant of the Dutch East India Company in Işfahan from the 1st March to the end of August, 1722. (L. L.).

⁵ This is an under-estimate of the distance; Varzana is 64 miles east by south of Işfahan as the crow flies. (L. L.).

⁶ Namely, Sayyid 'Abdullah Musha'sha', the Vali of 'Arabistan. He was then, as we know from the *Dagregister*, at Qumisha, two days' march south of Işfahan. (L. L.).

khans, *begs* (lords) and sons of *begs*, *Qullar*¹ and *Qurchis*,² that were available, adding: 'Get ready the cannon and ammunition, for you have to go to confront the Afghans and prevent them from approaching Işfahan'. They got ready 18,000 men and 24 cannon.

8. On the same day they sent officials (*muhasil*)³ to the villages who collected 12,000 musketeers (*tufangchis*) and brought them to Işfahan.

9. On the 20th February/3rd March, for the second time they checked (the numbers of) their forces, 30,000 men and 24 cannon;⁴ they left Işfahan and marched to Gulnabad, where the Afghans had (already) arrived, which is only 3 *farsakhs* or 15 *versts* from Işfahan.⁵

10. On the same day that the army left Işfahan the Shah sent the following order to the Armenians of Julfa: «As I have sent my troops out to give battle, you must send me 300 brave young Armenians, well armed and equipped, to the gates of the palace to act as guards.» The Mayor (*Kalantar*) and headmen (*kadkhuda-ha*) of Julfa (accordingly) sent 300 robust young Armenians to the Shah's palace to act as guards. They were very well equipped, each having a musket, pistol, sword, shield and

¹ The *Qullar* ('Slaves') were a corps which Shah 'Abbas I had formed mainly from Georgians and Persians, in order to break the monopoly of power of the *Qurchis*, the Turcoman tribal cavalry.

² The *Qurchis* had continued in being under Shah 'Abbas and his successors. The name is derived from the Mongolian word *qor*, meaning a quiver (see Professor Minorsky's translation of the anonymous *Tadhkirat al-Muluk*, p. 32n. (L. L.).

³ This is the Arabic word *مُحْصِل* (*muḥṣil*), signifying 'collector' or 'taxgatherer'. (L. L.).

⁴ These numbers agree with those given by other authorities, except that nothing is said in regard to the fact that Sayyid 'Abdullah, having collected 12,000 of his Arab cavalry at Qumisha, joined the main body of the army when it was on its way to Gulnabad, thus raising the total to 42,000. (L. L.).

⁵ The sense of this sentence is obscure; it could be taken as meaning that the Afghans were still 3 *farsakhs* from Gulnabad.

sabre; the muskets and pistols were of English and Dutch (*Hollandzi*) manufacture. The Qizilbash¹ seized all the arms and equipment of these 300 Armenians and dismissed them, saying: «We do not need you now; you must return to your homes; when we need you, we shall summon you.» The Armenians, however, refused to go away, saying: «The Shah has summoned us: we shall return only if he orders us.» They were then sent home by force, without their arms.²

11. On the 24th February/7th March the 30,000 (*sic*) Persian troop with their 24 cannon confronted the Afghans. On the following morning the Shah sent a courier (*chapar*) to the army camp with written orders to the *I'timad al-Daula* (Grand Vizier) and the other commanders (*omara*) saying: «On receiving and opening this letter you must wait no longer; you must attack the Afghans and fight them. Let God give the victory to whom He may choose.»

12. On the 25th February/8th March, at midday, the Persian troops, at the Shah's command, opened the battle against the Afghans. The army was arranged in this way:

Rustam Mirza, the commander of the Royal Guards, who was a brother of Wakhtang Khan of Tiflis,³ was stationed with his men on the right wing, opposite Mahmud. The *I'timad al-Daula*⁴ was in the centre with his troops and the *Qurchi-bashi*⁵ was on

¹ The Persian troops had been known as Qizilbash («Red Heads») since the early years of the XVIIth century. The Ottoman Turks had given this name to Shah Isma'il's tribal followers because they wore a scarlet cap with twelve gores (one for each of the twelve Imams). The author has applied the term «Qizilbash» indiscriminately to all Persian troops and has, in some cases, even applied it to Persian civilians (C. O. M. and L. L.).

² Compare Krusiński's account of this episode in his *History of the Revolution of Persia*, Dublin, 1729, p. 220. (L. L.).

³ Rustam was a half-brother of Wakhtang. He had the rank of *Qullar-aqasi*, or commander of the corps of *Qullar*.

⁴ Muḥammad Quli Khan. He had been appointed *I'timad al-Daula* in the previous year.

⁵ Shaikh 'Ali Khan. The *Qurchi-bashi* was in command of the *Qurchis*. (L. L.).

the left, with his corps, facing Amanullah Sulṭan, Maḥmud's commander-in-chief.¹ The *I'timad al-Daula* and the *Qurchi-bashi* attacked Amanullah with their forces. Amanullah had 60 swivel-guns (*zanburak*)², each mounted on a camel. He had placed them behind his men and then made the animals kneel. When the Persians attacked, Amanullah began to withdraw his men, feigning retreat, but he soon halted them and ordered the swivel-guns to open fire on the Persians. The *I'timad al-Daula* and the *Qurchi-bashi* and their men (then) began to fall back, and fled.

13. The General (*Qullar-aqasi*) of the Royal Guards (Rustam Khan) attacked Maḥmud very fiercely, and drove the Afghans back three times. Maḥmud was in great difficulties, (but) Amanullah, after routing the forces of the *I'timad al-Daula* and the *Qurchi-bashi*, came to his aid. Amanullah and Maḥmud thereupon surrounded the General of the Royal Guards, who had been left behind with his troops. He fought very bravely against Maḥmud, but he soon realised that he and his men were in a difficult position. His men also fled, leaving him with only 200 of the royal guards³ in the midst of the Afghan army. They too wished to fly, but could not do so. The General of the Royal

¹ This account of the disposition of the Persian and Afghan forces is not accurate. Sayyid 'Abdullah, the *Vali* of 'Arabistan, with his Arab cavalry, was on the Persian right. In the centre was the force under the Prime Minister, and in front of him and his men was the advance guard under Rustam Khan, the *Qullar-aqasi*. On the left wing was 'Ali Mardan Khan, the *Vali* of Luristan, with his tribal cavalry. The Afghan right wing was under Amanullah, a most experienced general. Maḥmud himself was in command of the centre, while a Sistani general named Naṣrullah commanded the Afghan left wing. (L. L.).

² The Persian word *zanburak* means 'little wasp'; it was applied to these light swivel-guns. La Mamie de Clairac, in his *Histoire de Perse depuis le Commencement de ce Siècle*, Paris, 1750, vol. I, p. 233, stated that a *zanburak* 'pouvoit porter à la fois une poignée de balles de mousquet' (he had obtained this information from Joseph Apisalmian). (L. L.).

³ According to La Mamie de Clairac, vol. I, p. 241, these men, who were 400 strong, were all Georgians. (L. L.).

Guards had a very good horse, and trusting to it, he endeavoured to escape, pursued by the Afghans. The General came to a wide canal and he tried to make his horse jump across it.¹ The horse, not being able to clear the canal, fell into it. This (incident) occurred in a very difficult place. (One of) the pursuing Afghans struck him on the head with a mace (*thopooz*). The General fell from his horse and other Afghans pierced him with lance-thrusts and killed him.² With the death of the General, the fighting came to an end.³

14. During the above-mentioned battle, news was brought to Mahmud that the Arab *Vali* Sayyid'Abdullah, had attacked his camp,⁴ and that help was needed. Mahmud was then deeply engaged in the fighting, and was himself in a serious position. He therefore replied as follows: «Let them take my baggage. We must go on fighting with all our heart. If they are victorious over us, it will not matter whether they capture our baggage now or later. If, by the will of God, we are the victors, then

¹ I have actually seen this canal, which is known as the Borzabad Kay (and also as the *Kay-i-Bugandi* or 'stinking canal'). It derives its water from *qanats* (underground conduits) a long distance to the north-west of Gulnabad. It runs in serpentine fashion in a south-south-easterly direction, passing some 600 yards to the east of the village of Gulnabad and ends at the now ruined village of Borzabad. It is a wide and deep canal; the sides are soft and the bed is very muddy. It is some 42 feet wide at the top, while at water-level it is about 15 feet across.

² This account of Rustam's death is confirmed by the *Dagregister*, a contemporary, but entirely independent, source. It is of interest to note that Kai Khusrau Khan, a half-brother of Rustam and full brother of Wakhtang, met his end in the same way when fighting against the Ghalzai Afghans in 1711. See Sekhnia Chkheidze's *Chronicle* (translated from the Georgian into French by M. F. Brosset and incorporated by him in his *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. II, part II, p. 31. (L. L.).

³ For a fuller and more accurate account of the battle, see La Mamie de Clairac, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 238-242.

⁴ The word used is *sandug-khana*, meaning «treasury». The other sources consulted all state that the *Vali* attacked the Afghans' camp and that he and his men spent their time pillaging it instead of attacking the Afghans from the rear. (L. L.).

not only shall we have our baggage but theirs too will be ours.» The Arab *Vali* (then) seized the whole of Maḥmud's baggage.

15. By the end of the battle the Persians had lost 1,700 men and the Afghans 130.¹ All the equipment (*zinath*), cannon and arsenal (*jabba-khana*) of the Persian troops were captured by the Afghans.

16. After the battle, the Afghans began to think that the Persians might be making a feigned retreat; they therefore remained for three days in their position in order to avoid being caught in a trap.²

17. After the three days had elapsed, Maḥmud advanced on Isfahan with his whole army, and for eight days fought on the Shahrستان side of the city.³ They failed to gain any ground, and realised that they could not take the city from that side.

18. Maḥmud sent 200 Afghans to Gask, Erivan, Kocher and Julfa⁴ to ascertain whether there were any Persian troops there. These 200 Afghans went to the above-named places, and found no Persians there except farmers; there was no one to oppose them. The same Afghans brought word to Maḥmud that there was not a single Persian in the Armenian quarter. This was on the 9th/20th March.

¹ This estimate of the Persian and Afghan losses in the battle is far too low. Joseph Apisalaymian, in his Turkish memorandum, stated that the Persian and Afghan killed numbered 5,000 and 500 respectively (see Professor T. H. Weir's summarised translation of this memorandum in *A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to Edward G. Browne*, p. 488). (L. L.).

² Maḥmud's inaction for some days after the battle is confirmed by other sources. According to Krusiński (pp. 205 and 206), Maḥmud even thought for a time of returning to Qandahar. (L. L.).

³ The suburb of Shahrستان is situated immediately to the north of the bridge of the same name over the Zayanda-rud; it is 3 miles S. E. of the centre of the city.

⁴ These are quarters of Julfa; they were so called because their original inhabitants had come from these towns and villages in Armenia and Adharbaijan.

19. On the 10th/21st March, Maḥmud mounted his horse and went with all his army to the garden of Farāḥabad.¹ He established himself in the garden of Farāḥabad, and sent his troops to take the quarters of Gask, Erivan, Tabriz and Dashti, and also those of Qaragel, Qocher and Julfa.² Their occupation extended as far as the Zayanda-rud.³ There were some Persian villages in this area, all of which they destroyed, killing all who fell into their hands and plundering everything that they could find in these villages.

20. At the same time, Maḥmud ordered 7,000⁴ of his men to advance towards the Marnan bridge⁵ and to fight their way through that district. They fought against the Persian troops and took and plundered the (quarters of) the Great and Little Charsus and half of the 'Abbasabad⁶ quarter. Maḥmud then ordered his men to withdraw from 'Abbasabad, saying: «You must wait until I can build ramparts at all the entrances to Julfa which are opposite the city (Iṣfahan); after strongly barricading these (entrances), we can fight the Persians, but without these fortifications it would not be advantageous to us to fight.»

¹ Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain had lavished enormous sums on the construction of his garden and palace at Farāḥabad; it was situated to the south-west of Julfa, and was 3½ miles from the centre of Iṣfahan. The Russian Ambassador Volynsky had an audience of the Shah at Farāḥabad in 1717. John Bell of Antermōny, who was surgeon to the Russian mission, described Farāḥabad as «an extremely pleasant place, adorned with gardens, fountains and cascades, surrounded with parks for all kinds of game» (*Travels*, vol. I, p. 96). See also *A Survey of Persian Art*, vol. II, pp. 1434-1436, and M. A. Godard's *Iṣfahan*, in *Athar-é-Iran*, 1937, No. 1, pp. 166 and 167. (L. L.).

² Maḥmud's occupation of Julfa has formed the subject of a poem in Armenian by Serapion Hekimian (see Bazmavep, the Armenian Journal of the St. Lazarus Monastery, Venice, 1850, Nos. 8, 9 and 11.

³ The Armenian text gives «Chandaru village», which is evidently a misreading of the MS. text.

⁴ This number is exaggerated; it was probably no more than 3,000. (L. L.).

⁵ The most westerly of the Iṣfahan bridges.

⁶ The 'Abbasabad quarter of Iṣfahan is on the north side of the river; it extends from the Allahverdi bridge to the Marnan bridge. It is incorrect to say that the Afghans occupied part of this quarter on this occasion. (L. L.).

21. After Maḥmud had captured Julfa, the inhabitants did not come to pay homage to him for four days. He sent men to summon the Mayor and elders of Julfa; the Julfa'is appeared before Maḥmud. Maḥmud's Chief Justice, whose name was Muḥammad Nishan,¹ came to the Julfa Armenians, and said: «It is now four days since we came here. Why did you not come to kiss Maḥmud Khan's feet? He is angry with you, and has ordered us to carry out a general massacre (*qatl-i-'am*) of the Armenians.» The Armenians replied: «It is Maḥmud's will, but we are not guilty of anything deserving massacre. How can you stain yourself with our innocent blood? We are the loyal subjects of our Shah, and half of our fellow-inhabitants of Julfa, men, women and children, have been sent to the city of Iṣfahan. Had we come to pay homage at Maḥmud's feet without a summons from you, and had this action come to the knowledge of the Shah or his commanders, they would assuredly put to death the half of our people of Julfa who are in the city. This is the reason why we did not come to you of our own accord. We now await Maḥmud's pleasure.»²

After the Armenians had thus replied, their mediator, who was a judge (*mufti*)³ pleaded very earnestly to Maḥmud Khan on their behalf. Maḥmud replied: «I shall not shed the Armenians' blood, but I shall fine them 120,000 tomans.⁴ Let them consider the matter promptly and pay.» He thereupon dismissed the Armenians. After taking their leave, the Armenians went to Muḥammad Nishan. They cast themselves at his feet, crying

¹ Muḥammad Nishan was a brutal character, as can be seen from Friar Alexander of Malabar's *Kort Narigt van de seer droevig ondergang der residentie-stad Spahan*. Friar Alexander, who was a Carmelite, was in Iṣfahan during the siege. The late Mr. H. Dunlop published an English translation of the *Kort Narigt* in the *Royal Central Asian Journal*, vol. XXIII, pp. 643-653. The original MS. is in the Koloniaal Archiv No. 1893, fo. 364, at The Hague. (L. L.).

² Krusiński, *op. cit.*, p. 222, stated that, when Julfa fell, the principal inhabitants went to the Afghan camp to make terms with Maḥmud; see also La Mamie de Clairac, vol. 1, p. 276. (L. L.).

³ A *mufti* is, literally, one who delivers a *fatwa* or judgment. (L. L.).

⁴ This figure is confirmed by Krusiński, p. 222, and by La Mamie de Clairac, vol. 1, p. 276. (L. L.).

out and pleading with him, saying: «Where can we raise so much money to give you? Come, we shall give you the keys of our houses. Go and enter them, if you wish to do so. Let all that is in them be yours.»

After much pleading by the Armenians, Muḥammad Nishan went to Maḥmud Khan; on returning, he talked to the Armenians for a long while, and finally made them agree to pay 70,000 to-mans.¹ The Armenians gave Maḥmud a promissory note for this sum, and a bailiff was appointed and was sent to collect the 70,000 tomans from Julfa. Maḥmud's bailiff and the Mayor and elders of Julfa went round from house to house, collecting all the jewellery, pearls, gold, silver and brocade with gold thread (*zar-baf*); these were all brought to one spot and piled up. The brocade with gold and silver thread and the silver were valued and taken over at one-quarter of their real price. The jewels, pearls and gold were weighed with a barley-weighing scale. Each *mithqal*² was calculated as being worth 1,000 *dinars*,³ that is to say, valuables that were worth more than 20,000 tomans were regarded as being worth (only) 9,000 tomans. The Armenians thereupon declared: «We cannot pay more than that at present; as to the rest, we shall consider it when the roads to the city (Iṣfahan) are opened.» They (the Afghans) also took away 62 girls⁴ from Julfa; after keeping them for some time, they returned 50 of them, retaining the remaining 12 as wives for themselves.⁵

¹ At that time the toman was worth £ 2-10-00. (L. L.).

² A *mithqal* was a weight equivalent to 71.6 grains. (L. L.).

³ There were 10,000 *dinars* in one toman (hence the name of the latter, for *toman* means «ten thousand» in Mongolian). In 1934 the value of the *dinar* was increased tenfold, so that there are now 100 *dinars* in a *rial* and therefore one thousand in a toman.

⁴ Krusiński, p. 222, stated that the Afghans took «fifty young girls of the best families of the Armenians». The entry in the Dutch *Dagregister* on the 25th March, 1722 stated that the Afghan had seized 42 Armenian girls; Maḥmud kept the best-looking for himself and handed over the rest to his councillors (*raadsliden*). (L. L.).

⁵ According to Krusiński (p. 222) and other sources, these girls showed such terrible grief at their abduction that even the Afghans were moved to pity and sent many of them back to their homes. (L. L.).

Furthermore, they seized 5,000 long satin coats (*kapa*), cotton material (*ghutni*),¹ broad cloth and woollen shawls, and gave them to their soldiers to wear. They also seized numbers of quilts, pillows and mattresses, all made of gold, *qalamkars*,² cotton (*ghutni*) and satin. Neither the coats nor the cotton material were valued or regarded as forming part of the indemnity. In addition to these things, they stole ornaments from the churches and entered, plundered and destroyed some houses.

22. Maḥmud built walls at the exits from Julfa and securely closed them all. The Persian troops did the same on their side. Having done this, they resumed fighting; in consequence, the Afghans could not gain one square inch of the town.³

23. Seeing that he could not take the city, Maḥmud endeavoured to find a mediator to come to terms with the Shah (on the basis) that (in return for) obtaining the provinces of Khurasan and Kirman and (an indemnity of) a few thousand *tomans*, he would make peace and go away from Iṣfahan. Maḥmud's men advised him: «Do not do that because the Shah is not yet reduced to such straits as (to agree) to give so much money and territory, and if you do that, it would be bad for us, because the Persians would realise that we were in a hopeless position.» Maḥmud retorted: «Then what should I do? We have suffered so many hardships in coming here, we are unable to take the city, yet you do not allow me to send a message (to the

¹ *Ghutni* is derived from the Arabic word قُطْن (*quṭn*), meaning 'cotton'. (L. L.).

² The *qalamkar* is a cotton fabric which is hand-printed with patterns in various colours; it is a speciality of Iṣfahan. (L. L.).

³ In the Armenian text the word *pnwpt'v* (*koslaken*) is given, whereas *pnwpt'v* (*kaqaken*), meaning 'from the town' was apparently intended. That the word *koslaken* is not a typographical error is shown by the footnote stating that it is the name of a place. Professor Patkanov, in his note No. 35, states that he was unable to trace such a name in the other authorities consulted. It is possible that the mistake arose through the limbs of the second and third letters of the word being inadvertently joined.

Shah).»¹ Maḥmud and his nobles (then) conferred together, and decided that there was no alternative to surrounding the city on all four sides and closing all the roads to it, so that no provisions could be brought in, making them (the Persians) starve, and perhaps forcing them to surrender. If they were unable to take the city in this way, it would be impossible to take it in any other way. Maḥmud accepted this advice, and gave orders for all the roads to be closed, so that no one was allowed to enter it, thus putting the Persians in a very difficult position, and famine ensued.²

24. In the course of these disturbances, three Khans, namely, Farajullah Khan of Hamadan, Shahverdi Khan³ and Zangana Khan, with 5,000 men, were marching towards Işfahan to help the Shah; Maḥmud's spies gave him full information regarding this. He ordered Naşrullah Sulṭan, «the Blind»,⁴ to advance im-

¹ La Mamie de Clairac, on the authority of Joseph Apisalaymian, stated that Maḥmud did enter into negotiations with the Shah at this stage, but that his terms were deemed exorbitant by the Persians; see his *Histoire*, vol. 1, pp. 290 and 291. According to Krusiński (p. 208) Maḥmud entered into negotiations with the Shah after he had received a message from Sayyid 'Abdullah, the Vali of 'Arabistan (who was a Sunni like himself), stating that the Shah was prepared to recognise Maḥmud as an independent ruler, to renounce all right to the province of Qandahar, and to pay a considerable sum as indemnity, provided that Maḥmud, for his part, would withdraw his troops. Maḥmud thereupon made counter-proposals which proved unacceptable to the Shah and his ministers. (L. L.).

² This is anticipating events. Mahmud could not complete the encirclement of Işfahan and shut off all the roads leading to it until after he had not only obtained a firm footing on the north bank of the river in or near the city itself, but had also managed to extend his lines round its western and northern limits. This he did not succeed in doing until the end of April, 1722. (L. L.).

³ Shahverdi Khan was a brother of 'Ali Mardan Khan, the Vali of Luristan. (L. L.).

⁴ Naşrullah, who was a Zoroastrian from Sistan, was nick-named Kōr Sulṭan, 'the Blind Sultan' because of his habit of keeping one eye closed (see Krusiński's *The History of the Revolution of Persia*, p. 274. He was a most capable general; it was doubtless owing to his military prowess that he was able to overcome the religious prejudices of the Afghans sufficiently to rise to high command under them. He was a kind and humane man, and always treated the Armenians well.

mediately against them with 4,000 men. (When) three stages out from Işfahan, in the morning, they came upon the Persians in camp, they immediately attacked, killing (many) and dispersing (the rest). The Persians lost 1,500 men killed, and the remainder fled. Their arms, ammunition, equipment, provisions and money were captured by the Afghans, who brought them to Maḥmud.

25. 'Ali Mardan Khan, who was in Khunsar at this time with 7,000 of his men, intended to go to the help of the Shah in Işfahan, but, on hearing of the fate of the three above-mentioned Khans, he remained in Khunsar.¹

26. In the month of July the Khan of the Bakhtiari (country)² with 8,000 men, had marched via Najafabad to the Shah's assistance. On receiving word that so many troops were coming to aid the Shah, Maḥmud immediately ordered Naşrullah Sulṭan, «the Blind», to take 4,000 men and advance against them. Early in the morning, when they were four *farsakhs*, which is 20 *versts*, from Işfahan, they came up to the Persian troops and saw that they were scattered in the gardens eating fruit. The «Blind Sulṭan» and his men immediately attacked the Bakhtiaris killing 3,000 of them; the rest escaped.³

27. On the same day, the *I'timad al-Daula* and Aḥmad Agha, the eunuch, who was the General of the Royal Guards,⁴ left

¹ This statement is incorrect. Having recovered from his wound, 'Ali Mardan Khan set out from Khurramabad with the object of relieving Işfahan. While en route, he sent a message to the Shah urging him to dismiss the Vali of 'Arabistan (whom, not without reason, he accused of not doing his duty as Commander-in-Chief) and requesting him to appoint him ('Ali Mardan) instead. The Shah refused, and 'Ali Mardan Khan, not being able to secure any co-operation from the generals in Işfahan, failed to relieve the city. (L. L.).

² His name was Qasim Khan. (L. L.).

³ Although the Bakhtiaris, like 'Ali Mardan Khan and his men, failed to relieve Işfahan, they were not so easily driven off as is stated here. On more than one occasion, they gave a good account of themselves in engagements with the Afghans. (L. L.).

⁴ Aḥmad Agha had been appointed *Qullar-aqasi* after the death of Rustam Khan, the half-brother of Wakhtang VI. He was a brave and most capable man. (L. L.).

Işfahan by the Tauqchi gate¹ with 8,000 men to fight the Afghans. The *I'timad al-Daula* soon ran away, but Aḥmad Agha fought on bravely. Finally he too was defeated and fled. The Persians lost 1,000 men; the rest all fled back to the town.²

28. During this month (July) the famine grew worse in the city.

Wheat cost 8 tomans per *mann*³ (*qitr*).

Rice cost 10 tomans per *mann*.

Melted butter cost 12 tomans per *mann*.

Sugar cost 12 tomans per *mann*.

Hens' eggs cost 200 dinars⁴ each.

There were no sheep, cows, horses or camels left in the city to be eaten, so they (the inhabitants) were obliged to eat asses' flesh, which cost 2 tomans per *mann*. All other foodstuffs were likewise exceedingly scarce and expensive; consequently, the inhabitants of the city were forced through hunger to eat dogs, cats, hides, animal dung, old shoes and any animal that they could catch. Hunger was so extreme that a lad cut off and ate his dead sister's breasts, and many persons boiled or roasted

¹ The Tauqchi gate, which no longer exists, was on the north-north-east of the city (L. L.).

² It was the Vali of 'Arabistan and not the *I 'timad al-Daula* who took part in this action with Aḥmad Agha. The defection of the Vali and his men at a critical moment of the battle turned victory into defeat. (L. L.).

³ The *mann* or maund is equivalent to the Armenian *qitr*, a word derived from the Greek *λίτρα* 'a pound'. In Persia both liquids and solids are sold by weight and not by measure. The *mann* was, until the adoption of the metric system, in use all over the country, but its weight had varied not only at different times, but also in different parts of the country. For instance, the Tabrizi *mann* was equivalent to 6 lbs. 9 oz., while the *Shah-mann* or *mann-i-Shani* was double that weight. The Hashimi *mann*, in use in the southern provinces only, was equivalent to 116 lbs., and the *mann-i-Rayy*, used only in Rayy and the surrounding district, was about 30 lbs. The *mann* in the text here is evidently the *Shah-mann*, which was in use in Işfahan and other parts of central Persia in the time of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain. At the present time the term *mann-i-Shahi* is used as the equivalent of 6 kilogrammes. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

⁴ As already explained, there were 10,000 *dinars* in a toman.

and then ate their own children.¹ Such was the famine in the city, but God showed mercy to the Armenians, for in Julfa food was so plentiful that bread cost 100 dinars per *mann*, a sheep from 150 to 200 dinars, and all other foodstuffs were proportionately cheaper.²

29. Seeing that all means were closed to him, that nothing eatable was left in the city and that the death roll was mounting daily, the Shah summoned a council of his nobles, saying to them: «We cannot drive off Maḥmud, who has besieged the town and has prevented all supplies from entering it. The only remedy for this is to send an envoy to Maḥmud to ask him whether, if we offer him part of the country, he will leave the town (Iṣfahan) alone.» They all agreed to the suggestion. The Shah (then) sent an envoy to Maḥmud, ordering him: «Go and endeavour to come to terms with Maḥmud by any means you can, provided that you persuade him to make peace with us, to leave this town and go away.»³

30. The Shah sent his envoy to Maḥmud, saying: «I shall give you 50,000, 60,000 and up to 100,000 tomans, the provinces of Khurasan and Kirman and my daughter in marriage; come, let us make peace, and be like father and son; only you should leave this town alone and go away.» The envoy went to Maḥmud and informed him of all that the Shah had said.

31. Maḥmud was not satisfied with these proposals, and gave the following reply to the envoy: «The 100,000 tomans and the

¹ See the very similar details given by Friar Alexander, *RCASJ*, vol. XXIII, p. 649, Muḥammad Muḥsin in his *Zubdat al-Tawarikh*, fol. 207a, and the *Dagregister*, 12th and 24th August, 1722. (L. L.).

² The entry in the *Dagregister* for the 14th July, 1722, is to the effect that food in Julfa was cheap and abundant. (L. L.).

³ According to the *Dagregister*, Mahmud made proposals of peace early in August, but his terms were considered too harsh. There was still hope then of the city being relieved. Two months later, however, all such hope had been abandoned, and conditions had become so appalling that the Shah and his ministers had to agree to unconditional surrender. See, *inter alia*, the letter from the Agent of the English East India Company at Iṣfahan dated the 20th/31st October, 1722 in the *Persia and Persian Gulf Records*, vol. XIV. (L. L.).

provinces which you offer are already mine; you give me my own money and country, and you also offer me your daughter. What am I to do with your daughter? I shall give all your daughters and all your kin to my slaves. What you have been contemplating is not reasonable. I shall not take my hands off Isfahan.» Maḥmud replied thus, and ordered him (the envoy) to go and relate to his Shah all that he had heard.¹

32. On his return, the envoy informed the Shah of all that he had heard from Maḥmud. The Shah and his nobles thought of escaping from the town,² but they saw that all roads were closed and that there was no means of escape. They therefore conferred, and came to the conclusion that there was no alternative to surrender, putting the town and themselves in Maḥmud's hands. This decision was taken on the 11th/22nd October.

33. On the 12th/23rd October the Shah had three camels left. He sacrificed them all and distributed (the flesh) to the public, and performed his prayers in tears. On the same day, at noon, the Shah, with his nobles, mounted on horseback,³ and proceeded to the foot of the Kuh-i-Suffa where they halted. They sent a messenger to Maḥmud to inform him that the Shah had come to visit him and to seek his protection. The Afghans replied that Maḥmud was asleep and that they must wait until he awoke. Maḥmud was not really asleep, but purposely informed the messenger that he was. They kept the Shah waiting on his horse in the sun for half an hour by the Kuh-i-Suffa; after that, he was conducted to Maḥmud.⁴

¹ Maḥmud, seeing that Isfahan was at its last gasp, was not prepared to accept any conditions. The Agent of the English East India Company described Maḥmud's terms as «Arrogant and Positive, which required the King to ride to the Enemy's Camp and there trust to his Will and Pleasure for the Conditions of his Life and Crown.» See his letter of the 20th/31st October, to which reference has already been made. (L. L.).

² This is incorrect. The Shah had thought of trying to escape as late as July, but by this time it was clear to him that the net had been drawn too close. (L. L.).

³ They were mounted on horses lent by Maḥmud, all those in the city having been eaten. (L. L.).

⁴ At Farahabad, where Maḥmud had taken up his residence. (L. L.).

34. When the Shah entered the room, Maḥmud was seated. He rose to his feet, and the Shah said: «*Salam 'alaikum.*» Maḥmud, who did not look at the Shah's face, but kept his gaze on the floor, replied: «*(Wa) 'alaikum (al-)salam.*» Maḥmud (then) sat down, and they led the Shah to a lower place¹ (where) he also sat down. With his own hand, the Shah took off the *jīqa*² from his head-dress and gave it to Maḥmud's *I'timad al-Daula*, requesting him to give it to Maḥmud to wear on his head. The *I'timad al-Daula*, on receiving the emblem, took it to give to Maḥmud who, looking at him out of the corner of eye, would not accept the *jīqa*. The *I'timad al-Daula* therefore returned it to the Shah who, taking it himself, advanced towards Maḥmud and fixing it on his head-dress, thus addressed him: «My son, owing to my sins, God does not deem me worthy of my kingdom any longer. Now God has given my kingdom to you, and this is the royal emblem which I have placed on your head. Long may you reign.» Having spoken thus, the Shah returned to his seat. Coffee was then served, and Maḥmud and the Shah drank first. With Maḥmud was a Baluchi commander (*sardar*) who approached the Shah and said to him: «Why did you do such a thing? To what a day have you brought us by giving yourself up and bringing such ruin upon us, thus making yourself and us Maḥmud's slaves?»³

¹ And therefore to a position of less importance and honour.

² The *jīqa* was an aigrette or plume of feathers set with precious stones. It was the emblem of royalty and was worn on the right side of the turban. See the portrait of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain by the talented Dutch artist and traveller Cornelius de Bruyn opposite p. 210 of the first volume of his *Travels* (London edition, 1737). (L. L.).

³ This description of the first meeting between Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain and Maḥmud is clearly based on information from Joseph Apisalaymian, who was present at it. It agrees fairly closely with the rather longer version (also derived from Joseph) given by Clairac in his *Histoire*, vol. I, pp. 342-344, and with Joseph's own description in his Turkish memorandum (see Professor Weir's translation on p. 489 of *A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E. G. Browne*). See also the description of this scene in my *Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan occupation of Persia*, pp. 171 and 172. So far as is known, Joseph Apisalaymian was the only non-Muslim present on this sad occasion. (L. L.).

Maḥmud kept the Shah with him for two days, during which time the Shah lived and ate apart.

35. On the afternoon of the same day¹ Maḥmud sent his Commander-in-Chief, Amanullah Sultān, with 2,000 Afghans, to the city to open up the ways into it, to take away the Persian guards posted at the various entrances and to take possession of the Shah's palace (*daulat-khana*). This Amanullah Sultān went to the town with his 2,000 Afghans, opened the roads, posted his men as guards, and then went to the Shah's palace, which he (also) placed under (the protection of) his own guards.² All the children who were in the Shah's living quarters, his harem, his daughters, his sisters and maids began to cry out and wail so loudly that their voices echoed through the whole town. Amanullah sent word to Maḥmud at Faraḥabad that he had taken (possession of) the town and the palace and that all the guards posted (there) were his own men. Maḥmud was thus reassured.

36. On the morning of the 14th/25th October Maḥmud and the Shah mounted and rode towards the town. Twelve mounted heralds preceded Maḥmud, cursing the Shah's creed,³ and proceeding via the Shiraz bridge⁴ and the Khwaju avenue, entered the town. The Shah separating himself from Maḥmud, went to the palace by a quiet road. The citizens had spread brocade and precious cloth (*zar* and *zar-baf*) over the roadway from the Khwaju quarter to the palace, over which Maḥmud rode on his horse. Maḥmud, with his troops shouting «Allah!» entered the palace by the Chahar Hauz («Four ponds») gate. Such was the way in which Maḥmud entered and occupied Iṣfahan and became Shah Maḥmud. In the fighting Maḥmud (had) killed 50,000 Persians and 100,000 people had perished in the town

¹ That is, the 22nd October.

² These details are confirmed by Muḥammad Muhsin in his *Zubdat ai-Tawarikh*, fol. 208a. (L. L.).

³ That is, the creed of the Ithna 'Ashariyya or sect of the Twelve Imams. (L. L.).

⁴ i. e. the Khwaju bridge.

from famine. This makes a total of 150,000 people lost.¹ It is said that during this war the Afghans lost no more than just over 2,000 men.²

37. On the 17th/28th October Mahmud opened the Shah's treasury to take it over. They found 4,000 tomans in cash, many jewels, pearls, gold and silver brocade, and every kind of ornament. The small amount of money in cash found was due to the fact that, during the nine (*sic*)³ months of the siege of the town, the Shah had paid each of his soldiers daily three gold pieces as extra pay (*donluq*)⁴ in order to encourage them to fight with a will and repel the Afghans,⁵ but it had been all in vain.

38. Mahmud gave the (ex-) Shah quarters in the palace⁶ where he began to live, and gave him three (of his) wives. On Nau Ruz Bahram Day (21st March) the Shah asked Mahmud to let him have two more (of his) wives, mentioning them by name. These were given to him. He also asked for some

¹ While the total of Persians killed is exaggerated, the number of those who perished in Isfahan from famine and disease was probably not less than 100,000. (L. L.).

² Although the Afghan casualties were far less than those of the Persians, the total of the former must have considerably exceeded 2,000. (L. L.).

³ This period is too long. The city was not completely cut off from contact with the outside world for more than 5 months. Even if we regard the siege as beginning when the first attacks were made on the city on the 12th March, it lasted under 7½ months. (L. L.).

⁴ The Turkish word *donluq* is used here in the sense of extra pay or gratuity.

⁵ Clairac (vol. 1, pp. 331 and 332) stated (on the authority of Joseph Apisalaymian) that, during the siege: «... on donnoit alors dans jusqu'à deux Sequins par jour à un simple Soldat; une paye si forte avoit épuisé les trésors.» In consequence, the Shah had to borrow large sums from the Dutch and English East India Companies and from individual merchants. (L. L.).

⁶ Friar Alexander, *loc. cit.*, p. 650, stated that the ex-shah was imprisoned in his own harem. Muhammad Muhsin, on the other hand, said that he was incarcerated in the Ayina-khana (a building of the type of the Chihil Sutun that formerly stood between the Khwaju bridge and the Sa'adatabad palace; it no longer exists). See the *Zubdat al-Tawarikh*, fol. 208a. (L. L.).

jewels, which were likewise given; he ordered the jewellers to make ornaments with these (jewels) for his wives, and when the master-jeweller gave the finished ornaments to the Shah, the latter said: «Are you aware that I have no money to pay your wages? I shall ask Maḥmud to pay you for your labour.» Maḥmud also appointed an Afghan *yüz-bashi*¹ with his men to guard the Shah all the time, and they treated him well and kept him in good health. Maḥmud sometimes visited the Shah himself; at other times he sent his *Beglar* (lords) to see him. The Shah informed Maḥmud: «I believed in the Qizilbash (Persian troops) and that is why I am in my present plight. You must not trust them, as they are all traitors. Kill them. You must not expect any good from them, as they did not do anything good for me.»

Six months after taking Iṣfahan, Maḥmud said to the Shah: «I am going to send you to Qandahar, so that you may see the place for yourself», and he sent him away, ordering an Afghan captain to accompany him to Qandahar. At Gulnabad, which is the first stage of the journey, the Shah fell ill and wept with grief; he implored the captain who was accompanying him, saying: «I have become an old man. Why does Maḥmud send me to Qandahar? What have I got to do there?» The captain reported the matter to Maḥmud, saying: «The Shah is ill and asks you to do him the favour of allowing him to return.» Maḥmud gave orders to write to the captain to bring the «Mulla»² back to Iṣfahan. The Shah returned from Gulnabad, and was given his former quarters in the palace, as well as his five wives. Maḥmud defrayed the Shah's expenses.³

39. The Shah's sons and brothers, numbering 35 persons, were also kept in the palace. The Afghans *yüz-bashi* and his men were appointed to keep watch over them; they were well treated, and Maḥmud also paid their expenses.

¹ Commander of one hundred or centurion.

² When a young man the ex-Shah had been nicknamed «Mulla Husain» because of his pious ways and his zeal in reading the Qur'an. (L. L.).

³ This story of Maḥmud wishing to send the ex-Shah to Qandahar seems most unlikely; it is not confirmed in any of the other sources consulted. (L. L.).

40. Maḥmud guarded the Shah and his children carefully, because one of his sons¹ had escaped from Iṣfahan to Tabriz. Had this prince not run away, Maḥmud would have exterminated the Shah's whole family.

41. Maḥmud had married one of the Shah's daughters. The rest of the Shah's daughters and sisters and the women of the harem were all distributed amongst his commanders (*omara*) and captains (*yüz-bashis*).

42. When Maḥmud captured Iṣfahan, he did not kill all those who came to congratulate him, but all those who failed to do so he summoned; he (then) confiscated their property and put them to death.

43. Maḥmud retained ten of the Qizilbash commanders in their positions.² He made the former *I'timad al-Daula* his *I'timad al-Daula*; he followed the same course with the *Qurchi-bashi* and the *Qullar-aqasi*. The last two were ordered to gather together all their subordinates (*qul*, i. e. *qullar*, and *qurchis*) and to arrange for them to be given their fixed pay and always to be ready for regular service.

44. On the 29th October/9th November Maḥmud summoned a general (major) council at which all the Afghan and Persian commanders were present. He said to the *I'timad al-Daula*, the *Qurchi-bashi* and the *Qullar-Aqasi*: «You know (very) well how disorganised the country became during the reign of Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain because of his worthlessness. He had no justice; he was ignorant and incompetent. Now that I have come here,

¹ This was Tahmasp Mirza, Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain's third son, who escaped from Iṣfahan with a strong escort on the night of the 7th/8th June, 1722. See note 2 on p. 2 above. (L. L.).

² This statement is correct as far as it goes, but Gilanentz does not add that Maḥmud duplicated these appointments, making his own leaders understudy the Persian ministers, thereby not only training his leaders in the art of government, but also using them as a check on the Persians. He put to death all those Persians who had betrayed their sovereign with the exception of Sayyid 'Abdullah, the *Vali* of 'Arabistan. He spared his life, possibly because of some promise that he had made and the fact that he was a fellow-Sunni, but dismissed him from his post and put him in prison. (L. L.).

I do not wish you to be as you were before. I wish to eradicate the evils of this town, and to those who are good and who love me sincerely in their hearts I wish to grant power, to reward them and to raise them to high dignity. Now, I am sure that you truly want me. Let us now consider how we can get hold of the Prince (Tahmasp), so that the country may be at peace and we be free, the governor to govern and the farmer to farm, and bloodshed to cease.» These commanders took the oath and recited the opening chapter (*fatheh okhmish*) of the Qur'an as a proof that they sincerely wanted him and that they would shed their blood in his service. Then the (Persian) *I'timad al-Daula* said to Maḥmud: «If you will so order, I shall write to the Prince (and induce him) to come to your presence and obey (you).» Maḥmud said: «There is no reason to think that the Prince will come of his own accord and obey me; he must (therefore) be brought at the point of the sword. I shall appoint a commander to go with his troops to Qazvin, capture the Prince and bring him here.»

45. On the 30th October/10th November, Maḥmud ordered his (chief) commanders to get their troops ready. The great Sardar Amanullah Sulṭan, Ashraf Sulṭan¹ and Naṣrullah Kōr Sulṭan prepared 6,000 Afghans and 2,000 Persians. He placed the 6,000 Afghans under the command of the above-named leaders, and the 2,000 Persians he placed under the command of the brother of the (Persian) *I'timad al-Dāula*, thus making a total of 8,000 men.² And on the 2nd./13th November these 8,000 men,

¹ Ashraf was Maḥmud's cousin. Relations were very strained between them, as Maḥmud had murdered Ashraf's father 'Abd al-'Aziz in 1717 in order to become head of the Ghalzais. (L. L.)

² Clairac, on the authority of Joseph Apisalaymian, stated that this force consisted of 6,000 Afghans and 4,000 'étrangers', and that it left Iṣfahan towards the end of November. See his *Histoire*, vol. II, pp. 26 and 27. Krusiński, p. 260, said that Maḥmud gave Amanullah «8,000 Men of his best Troops» but made no mention of and Persian contingent. Maḥammad Muḥsin, in his *Zubdat al-Tawarikh*, fol. 210b, stated that the force consisted of 3,000 Afghans and 1,000 Qizilbash; this estimate of the strength of the force is more likely to be correct, as it seems unlikely that Maḥmud could spare a larger number of men for this expedition. (L. L.).

with their commanders, left Işfahan for Qazvin to occupy that town, to capture the Prince and to bring him to Işfahan.

46. On the 3rd/14th November Maḥmud sent the *I'timad al-Daula's* master of the threshold (*Eshik-aqasi*)¹ to Kashan, appointing him as vizier. This new vizier sent an urgent courier to Kashan, so that the Kashanis, on being informed of the arrival of the new governor, received him with due honour.

47. Amanullah Khan,² marching with his troops, had halted outside Kashan. The former and the new governors (*vazirs*), the mayor (*kalantar*) and the elders of Kashan had gone out to meet Amanullah Khan, taking fine presents with them. Amanullah Khan treated them with much affection and stated: «You may rest assured that, with Maḥmud Shah's generosity, we shall govern you well.» The Kashanis had spread carpets and cloth with gold thread (*zar payandaz*) in honour of this Amanullah, so that he might ride over them on his horse all through Kashan on his way to Qum.

48. Amanullah Khan, on reaching (the outskirts of) Qum with his troops, could not enter the town, because the Qumis opposed them with force. So they left Qum alone, and proceeded to Sava, where they saw 6,000 Persian troops encamped. These Persian troops, seeing the Afghans approach, fled. The Afghans also passed by Sava. The Prince in Qazvin heard that the Afghans had passed Sava; he would not stay there any longer, but fled to Zankan (Zanjan).³

¹ This should read *Eshik-aqasi-bashi*, which means, literally, 'head of the masters of the threshold'. This official acted as master of the ceremonies at meetings and functions and was also in charge of the guards and door-keepers. In this connection, see Professor Minorsky's commentary on the *Tadhkirat al-Muluk*, p. 118. (L. L.).

² The author indiscriminately calls the Afghan leader «Amanullah Khan», «Amanullah», «Amanullah Sulṭan» and «Great Amanullah Sulṭan».

³ Tahmasp, who had proclaimed himself Shah in Qazvin on the 14th. Šafar (24th November), had shown but little zeal in collecting troops to attack the Afghans. He and his ministers had given them-

49. As the Afghans approached Qazvin, the townspeople, young and old, went out to greet them with music. Having spread carpets under the hooves of Amanullah's horse, they led them into the town with great pomp, allotting quarters to each of the officers and men in accordance with their rank.

50. Amanullah Khan, a few days after occupying Qazvin, demanded provisions from the townspeople, who hastened to deliver a few thousand *mann* of them, and they set about preparing and handing over the rest.

51. Two days later, Amanullah demanded 20,000 tomans in cash from the Qazvinis. The Qazvinis bargained a great deal in regard to this sum, until they and the Afghans mutually agreed on 6,000 tomans. The Qazvinis endeavoured to collect this sum promptly, together with the (still) undelivered part of the provisions. Amanullah furthermore sent (a message) demanding 60 virgins. The Qazvinis regarded this last demand as very severe, but they eventually undertook to collect and hand over these girls as well.¹

52. On occupying Qazvin, Amanullah Khan demanded 300 tomans from the Armenians. Because the Armenians of this town were poor, the Qazvinis all testified that these people had no money with which to pay and that they lived on their daily earnings. Amanullah ordered them: «Pay the sum that you used to pay to the previous Shah to the twelve fighting Georgians whom I have with me, and, in addition, give one girl to each man.» These Georgians behaved very insolently towards the Armenians

selves up to pleasure instead of preparing for the relief of Isfahan. Not thinking that Mahmud would take action against him when winter was beginning, he had been foolish enough to disband what forces he had; consequently, when Amanullah and his force drew near, Tahmasp fled to Zanzan and thence to Tabriz. See Muḥammad Muḥsin, fol. 210b, and Clairac, vol. II, p. 27.

¹ These details are not given in the other sources consulted, but there is no reason to believe that they are not correct. There is no doubt that Amanullah behaved in a very high-handed manner at Qazvin. (L. L.).

and maltreated them so much that even the Afghans did not act with such wicked injustice. And when the Qazvinis revolted against the Afghans and defeated them, they also wanted to kill these Georgians, but the very same Armenians hid the Georgians so that the Persians could not lay hands on them.¹

53. Amanullah sent some tax-collectors (*muhasil*) to the townspeople to demand the money in cash and also to expedite the delivery of the girls. They asked them: «Why do you delay? You must hand them this very day or you will be insulted, maltreated and beheaded.» The Qazvinis were at the end of their patience over this matter. Naşrullah, «the Blind Sultan», who had gone to Aybahar and Khurramdarra with 1,000 men, had met with active resistance at both these places, and the Afghans, having lost 350 men, had retreated to Qazvin. The townspeople of Qazvin, on learning of the bravery of the men of these two villages, took heart and said to themselves that the situation could not continue in this way. They took counsel together and decided: «This is no life that we are leading. It is better to fight the Afghans and either be killed or kill them and live in freedom.»

54. On the 20th/31st December² the Afghan tax-collectors went out and began to press the Qazvinis (saying): «Where are the money, the supplies and the girls? Bring them and deliver them to us quickly, otherwise we shall kill you all like dogs.» The chief of the Afghan tax-collectors said: «You dogs, how long are you going to cheat us? If you do not send us the money, the provisions and the girls today, we shall massacre you all (*qatl-i-'am*).» A ruffian (*luṭi*) retorted, saying: «We are not dogs; you are the dog, and so is he who sent you!» At these words, the tax-collector's hand went to his sword, that he might strike and kill the ruffian, but the latter was quicker; he drew

¹ There is also no mention elsewhere of the treatment of these Armenians or of the 12 Georgians in Amanullah's forces. (L. L.).

² According to Joseph Apisalaymian, as quoted by Clairac (vol. II, p. 55), the rising against the Afghans began on the 8th January, 1723. This date is also given by Shaikh Muḥammad 'Ali Ḥazin. (L. L.).

his sword and cut the tax-collector in two.¹ The Qazvinis thereupon immediately beat the drums² to summon their men to fight the Afghans.

As soon as Amanullah heard that the Qazvinis had risen in revolt and wished to fight, he ordered two of his captains to proceed to the place (of the disturbance) and quieten them. These officers and their men, on reaching the troubled area, were unable to deal with the situation. Eventually Amanullah, seeing that the trouble was spreading and that there was no alternative (to fighting), went in person to the scene with his troops, and then mounted and charged the Qazvinis, killing many of them and dispersing others to their houses; he then completely destroyed three of the quarters (*mahla*) of the town by fire. Whilst this disturbance and turmoil were in progress a Qizilbash captain with 150³ Qajar troops entered the town and attacked the Afghans.⁴ The Afghans, thinking that this was the Commander-in-Chief with all his forces, turned their backs and went to the 'Ali Qapu side⁵ of the Maidan-i-Shah. The Qazvinis, regaining their courage, emerged from their houses and collected in the Maidan-i-Shah. They pressed the Afghans (so hard) that they fled to the Shah's palaces; from there they escaped by pulling down one of the walls at a secluded spot, and fled in the direction of Isfahan.

In this fighting Amanullah had received a bullet wound, but the bullet having lodged in his shoulder, he was not killed. The Afghans lost 1,200 men in this battle.⁶ Ashraf Sultan of the Afghans did not retreat from Qazvin to Isfahan, but escaped

¹ It is not clear from the text whether the ruffian drew his own sword (assuming that he had one) or whether he snatched the tax-collector's sword from him and killed him with it.

² *Naqqara*. Amanullah had not reckoned with the good fighting spirit of the Qazvinis. (L. L.).

³ Professor Patkanov has erroneously given this figure as 1,150.

⁴ The intervention of the Qajars is not mentioned elsewhere and is unlikely. (L. L.).

⁵ The 'Ali Qapu («Lofty Gate»), which is still in existence, was built by Shah Tahmasp I. (L. L.).

⁶ Clairac, quoting Joseph Apisalaymian, also put the Afghan losses at 1,200. Krusiński's figure of 4,000 is obviously much exaggerated. (L. L.).

to Qandahar with 100 men.¹ Amanullah retreated from Qazvin with 600 men, and, on reaching Arasang he encountered 4,000 Persian troops whom he at once attacked. The Persians fled, leaving their baggage and everything they had to the Afghans, who collected them all and took them to Isfahan.² At the time of their flight from Qazvin, the Afghans had cash and goods to the value of 30,000 tomans, (all of) which they left at Qazvin. The Qazvinis confiscated these things, and the Afghans retreated towards Isfahan in disgrace.³ With the Afghan forces there had been 2,000 Persian troops under the command of the brother of the (Persian) *I'timad al-Daula*. These 2,000 men remained at Qazvin with their commander.

55. When Amanullah with his 600 men reached Kashan on his retreat from Qazvin, the Kashanis locked the gates of the town and refused to allow him to enter. They fired on him and fought against him.

56. Mahmud was very much perturbed on hearing the account of the events at Qazvin and of the defeat of his forces (there). He mounted his horse and rode round the city twice every day so that the Isfahanis should not follow the example of the Qazvinis and rise against him. He said to Lutf 'Ali Khan, the *Qullar-aqasi*,⁴ and the *Tufangchi-aqasi*:⁵ «I wish to send you as envoys to the Prince in order that you may make terms

¹ Clairac, again on the authority of Joseph Apisalaymian, put the strength of Ashraf's detachment at 300. (L. L.).

² There is no mention elsewhere of this action, which seems most improbable. After the ordeal which they had been through, Amanullah's men were in no mood for further fighting for some time. (L. L.).

³ Professor Patkanov translated this sentence as follows: «The Qazvinis took possession of all these, and, following in the footsteps of the Afghans, went to Isfahan.» This is obviously a mistranslation.

⁴ Lutf 'Ali Khan Daghistani was the nephew of Fath 'Ali Khan Daghistani whom Shah Sultan Husain had disgraced and blinded because of a false accusation that he was aiming at the throne. Owing to the jealous of his rivals, he was subsequently dismissed from his post as Governor-General of Fars and commander-in-chief of the forces there. (L. L.).

⁵ The commander of the *Tufangchis* or musketeers.

between me and the Prince. As I want you to go with due pomp and dignity, you may take with you any of the nobles¹ who wish to accompany you.» Meanwhile he had ordered the *Qurchi-bashi* to collect all the men under his command and to parade them before him.

Since Maḥmud's capture of Isfahan, the nobles had not left their houses; however, on hearing the news that envoys were to be sent, they all came out in order to accompany Luṭf 'Ali Khan. They made their preparations. With this cunning move, Maḥmud lured all the nobles from their hiding places and deceived the Qizilbash by informing them that they were being sent as envoys to the Prince, in order that they might be pleased and assured that they were going to him in Tabriz. Maḥmud played these tricks so that the Qizilbash should not revolt against him.²

57. In 1723, on the 13th./24th. January, at noon, Amanullah Khan returned to Isfahan. On the evening of the same day Maḥmud Shah ordered Luṭf 'Ali Khan to come with his men and parade before him. The elder brother of Maḥmud Quli Khan, who was the *Darugha*, was likewise summoned by Maḥmud to his presence. The *I'timad al-Daula* and the *Qurchi-bashi*, with their respective troops, likewise came to Maḥmud Shah.

Maḥmud Shah at first gave orders for the arrest of Luṭf 'Ali Khan and for the *Darugha* and his brother to be beheaded; he had all those who had wished to go with Luṭf 'Ali Khan to the Prince at Tabriz beheaded in his presence. All these were *Khans*, *begs*, and *begzada-ha*. He also summoned the *Qurchi-bashi*, and had him arrested and put to death, together with all his followers. Furthermore, he gave orders for the *I'timad al-Daula* also to beheaded, because his brother had remained in Qazvin. At that time there were two Afghan captains in Maḥmud's presence who had come from Qazvin. They threw themselves down at Maḥmud's feet, crying: «If his brother had not been in Qazvin, the Qazvinis would have killed us all. His brother saved our

¹ The term used is *begzada-ha*, «the sons of lords».

² See also La Mamie de Clairac, vol. II, p. 60. Krusiński, p. 263, states that Maḥmud invited the Persian nobles to a royal festival, and then had them murdered. (L. L.).

lives as well as those of others, and he wanted to come with us to Işfahan, but he could not do so. If you wish to kill him, please kill us first and then him.» Maḥmud Shah listened to their pleading and refrained from putting the *I'timad al-Daula* to death, and gave orders for him to retain his position as *I'timad al-Daula*. The nobles who were killed numbered 148. On the next day he had the historiographer (*vaqi'a-navis*) of the ex-Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain and his director of the arsenal (*jabba-dar-bashi*) put to death.

After this general massacre (*qatl-i-'am*), the people were greatly terrified and no one was seen in the streets, no one entered the town, and consequently no provisions were brought in. The commanders therefore reported to Maḥmud Shah: «Because you carried out this massacre in so open a manner no one enters the town, and they bring no provisions; we are starving.» Thereafter Maḥmud did not kill anyone publicly, but put them to death secretly whenever he wanted to do so. They searched (the city), going from quarter to quarter, and any Qizilbash whom they found, they took to the Government palace and put them to death secretly. Those who thus perished numbered 1,600.¹

58. On the 15th/26th January an envoy (*elchi*) from Ḥasan Pasha of Baghdad arrived in Işfahan; his name was 'Osman Aga and he had a suite of 120 men. This envoy had come to congratulate Maḥmud on his capture of Işfahan. Maḥmud sent a *yüz-bashi* with his company one stage out of Işfahan to meet the envoy and to escort him with due honour to the town. He was also appointed to act as host to the envoy. As the envoy entered the town, he was given a good house, and orders were given for his food, consisting of melted butter, rice, bread, mutton and chicken, to be delivered to him daily from appropriate sources, but no money was given to him. Maḥmud Shah sent Muḥammad Nishan² to the envoy to inform him: «Maḥmud Shah wants your

¹ This is too low a figure. Krusiński (p. 264) stated that Maḥmud had 3,000 of the ex-Shah's royal guards massacred, and also many others killed. Clairac (vol. II, p. 64) stated that, in all, 8,000 men were put to death. (L. L.).

² Muḥammad Nishan, as stated on p. II above, was Maḥmud's Chief Justice. (L. L.).

letter of credence; give it to me to take to him.» The envoy replied to Muḥammad Nishan: «Ḥasan Pasha instructed me to deliver this letter into the hands of Maḥmud Shah personally.» Muḥammad Nishan reported this to Maḥmud. Ten days after the arrival of the envoy in Iṣfahan, Maḥmud summoned a major council at which he was present. He summoned the envoy as well, and he was brought to the council. Maḥmud had previously given orders for one thousand Afghans to be dressed in cloth of gold (*zar-baf*) and marten furs and for them to stand where the council was held. The council was large and imposing, and only he (Maḥmud) and the envoy were seated; no one else was allowed to sit down there. After the council was over, Maḥmud read the envoy's letter of credence, and said that, as he was not an envoy but a spy, he wished to put him in prison and starve him to death. Maḥmud Shah's *mufti* did not favour this course of action, and said to the Shah: «Whatever he (the envoy) may be, he is an envoy today; as (an) envoy is immune, you must not do that.» Maḥmud agreed to this suggestion, and the envoy was retained for twenty-one days, after which he was given a small present and a robe of honour (*khal'at*). They also answered the letter, and gave him the reply to take away.

59. This Joseph Apisalaymian had known the envoy previously, so the envoy sent his head footman (*shaṭīr-bashi*) to ask Joseph to come to him as he had business (to do) with him. Joseph, having put on Turkish attire, went to him. The envoy inquired about events in Iṣfahan, saying: «You have been here. Tell me what is the story of all that had occurred.» Joseph, however, informed him only of what was unimportant regarding Iṣfahan; he gave him no information of any consequence.

A few days later, he (the envoy) sent for him again, and asked him: «What is the revenue from the port customs?»¹ Joseph answered that he thought that it would amount to some

¹ The Gombroom or Bandar 'Abbas customs. By the agreement between Shah 'Abbas I and the English East India Company regarding the joint operations against the Portuguese stronghold of Hormuz, the East India Company was, in return for its services, to receive half the Bandar 'Abbas customs revenue and also to be duty free at that port. (I. L.).

15,000 tomans a year, but that now there was not so much revenue, and that no ships then frequented the port. The port was closed, and all shipping went to Başra, where they (the Turks) received all the customs dues.

This man Joseph informed me that he had answered the envoy in that way, but that he had heard from the French that, some years previously, the customs dues had amounted to 40,000 tomans; he (Joseph) had been there in 1721, when the annual hire (*ijara*) of the port was 17,000 tomans.¹ The envoy also inquired regarding the revenue from the Bahrain pearls. To this Joseph replied that there was no longer any revenue from Bahrain, because it had been in the hands of the Muscat Arabs for some years. The pearl divers had dispersed, and no one remained to seek for the pearls. Bahrain was ruined. Joseph said to me: «I gave this false answer to the envoy in order that he might not have to go to Baghdad and go from there to occupy Bahrain.»² «I have had the information verified that the annual Bahrain revenue is 18,000 tomans.»

Thereupon the envoy also said: «Persia's revenue is very large. When I go to Istanbul, I shall ask the Sultān (Khundkar) for 16,000 troops to come to Işfahan and to proceed from here to occupy the country up to Qandahar. The Afghans are not men (of any importance). This is a punishment that God has sent to Persia.»

60. On the 4th/15th February the envoy was given permission to depart, and Maḥmud Shah gave orders for him to be informed that he must not take away with him any Persian men or women slaves; if he did so, he would be disgraced. On the day that this envoy was to leave Işfahan, an Afghan *yüz-bashi*

¹ It has not been possible to check these figures. (L. L.).

² Sultān ibn Saif, the Imam of Muscat, had taken the Bahrain islands in 1717. With the aid of Portuguese vessels, Persia had recovered the islands in the following year. She was not, however, destined to retain them for long, because Shaikh Jabbara of Ṭahiri, who was only nominally a Persian subject, captured the islands during the troubled period following the Afghan invasion of Persia. Shaikh Jabbara's forces held the islands until they were ejected by Nadir in 1736. (L. L.).

was sent with his men one *farsakh* out of the city and halted there, while another *yüz-bashi* was posted with his company at the Tauqchi gate, in order that they might search the envoy at both these places when he left, and see that he did not take any Persians away with him. These *yüz-bashis* discovered 12 Persians with the envoy, and beheaded them all in his presence; they had also hidden two women in chests to take away with him.¹

61. The envoy arrived at Hamadan from Isfahan, and the Khan of Hamadan kept him under observation as a suspect prisoner (*goiz dudsaqi*) for 45 days, on the Prince's orders.² The envoy himself had shown³ that he had gone to Maḥmud not as a traitor to the ex-Shah, but in order to ascertain what had happened and how the events had occurred. After 45 days, on receipt of fresh orders from the Prince, the envoy was released. On reaching Baghdad, the envoy saw that Ḥasan Pasha was about to send troops to Hamadan to effect his release and bring him back. After his arrival, these troops were dismissed and dispersed while he remained for two days in Baghdad. At the end of these two days, he travelled speedily to Istanbul (in company) with 100 men.

62. Maḥmud is friendly with the Turks, but the latter are not so with him; up to this time, the Turks have not shown any sign of friendship to Maḥmud.⁴

¹ Compare Clairac's version (which was also based on Joseph's information). Clairac stated (vol. II, p. 66) that when the envoy left Isfahan, «on le fouilla deux fois, lui et ses équipages, aux portes de la ville; et à une lieue de-là, quelques caisses que l'on n'avoit pas ouvertes ayant été visitées, l'on tira deux jeunes Persanes que l'on poignarda sur le champ, ainsi que quelques esclaves de la même nation qui s'étoient travestis en Turcs, pour se sauver plus facilement à la faveur du cortège». (L. L.).

² Tahmasp.

³ In the text the word *elchinoon* (էլչինոն) ('envoys') is incorrect. The word *էլչին* (*elchin*) ('envoy') has been joined to the next one (*y)oor*n ('himself'), the 'r' of which has been dropped, thus making *elchinoon*. Professor Patkanov, by reading *elchinoon*, has mistranslated the whole sentence.

⁴ This statement is contradictory, in view of Maḥmud's treatment of the Turkish envoy.

63. Maḥmud sent troops in the direction of Shiraz,¹ and attacked Ḥajji Baqir, the Arab who had been keeping the villages under his control in that area: Maḥmud's forces crushed and dispersed Hajji (Baqir's) troops, and brought large quantities of provisions from there, so that foodstuffs became a little cheaper in Iṣfahan.

64. Maḥmud despatched Naṣrullah Kōr Sultān with 1,200 Afghans troops to (attack) Hamadan. The Khan of Hamadan came out with his 5,000 men to oppose him. The Afghans attacked these 5,000 Persians, who, on being routed, retired to the town. The Afghans twice attacked Hamadan. On the first occasion they were unable to accomplish anything, and consequently retired to Dargaz,² destroying the Persian villages, slaughtering the inhabitants and looting their property. They also took with them 5,000 families of the Sunni sect from Dargaz to Iṣfahan.³

65. After capturing Iṣfahan, Maḥmud levied fines on the Armenians, Europeans (*Franks*), Musulmans (*Turks*)⁴ and Mul-tanis, and there is a detailed account of all that he extorted from them in the form of money, presents, coats of honour (*khal'at*) and fines on various pretexts on the other side of this page. He fixed an indemnity of 70,000 tomans in cash on the Julfa Armenians, of which he received 17,000 (in cash) and a promissory note for the remainder. Because they were unable to pay

¹ These troops, who were under the command of Naṣrullah, did not go to Shiraz, but only as far as Qumisha (now Shah-Reza), a small town two stages to the south of Iṣfahan. See Clairac, vol. II, p. 68 (he, however, states erroneously that Qumisha was situated to the north-east of Iṣfahan).

² This is intended for Dargazin, a district to the north of Hamadan.

³ In consequence of the meagreness of this forces as compared with the potential strength of the Persians, Maḥmud considered it politic gradually to replace the Shi'i inhabitants of Iṣfahan with Sunnis such as the Dargazin tribes-people. All of those who accompanied Naṣrullah to Iṣfahan did not go willingly, and a number deserted on the way. See Clairac, vol. II, p. 72; Krusiński, p. 268, estimated the numbers of the Dargazin people at 1,000,000; they were, he said, 'a strong robust people'.

⁴ The Armenians often use the word 'Turk' to denote a Muslim.

the whole 70,000 tomans within the specified time, he beheaded the following four persons: Khachik, the Mayor (*kalantar*), Sarhat, the son of Grigor Khaldarentz, Manook Samburi, and Sarhat, the son of Akopjan Kolakapaentz.¹ Furthermore, they wanted to kill Akopjan, the son of Hovsep Khaldarentz, but here the bailiff was of great assistance and saved his life, though it cost him a large sum of money. So the Armenians were not left in peace until they had paid the 53,000 tomans in full. They were thereby reduced to great straits, and many of them became destitute.

66. He assessed the Indians' indemnity at 25,000 tomans, of which they paid 20,000; they could not pay the remaining 5,000. All these Indians dispersed. They were so afflicted that some took poison and died, while others perished from grief or fled. Only a few² Indians were left in the town; these people had advanced money to the Muhammadans against promissory notes (*sanad*) and jewels, gold, silver and house ornaments (*zinat*). Mahmud took all these valuables from them without payment, not even regarding them as forming part of their indemnity. The shops of those Multanis who had died or had fled were consequently closed, but Mahmud had them opened and seized all their contents.

67. He levied a heavy fine of 20,000 tomans on the Chief Physician (*Hakim-bashi*) of the ex-Shah,³ because he had learnt

¹ Tombstones of these Armenians and of others put to death by the Afghans are still to be seen in the Armenian churches in Julfa. Some of these tombs have lengthy inscriptions. The names of three of the Armenian victims mentioned here are given in mutilated form by Friar Alexander of Malabar in his *Kort Narigt*; see the *RCAJ*, vol. XXIII, p. 650. (L. L.).

² In the text the word *parai* ('few') has been wrongly printed with a capital letter; this has led Professor Patkanov to suppose that it was the name of a place. He has consequently mistranslated this part of the sentence, saying: 'and others ran away to Par'.

³ His name was Rahim Khan. He, Sayyid 'Abdullah, the *Vali* of 'Arabistan, and Muhammad Husain, the bigoted *Mulla-bashi* or Chief Mulla, had all exercised a very strong influence on the weak Shah. By giving him bad advice, they were largely responsible for the disastrous end of the dynasty. (L. L.).

that this man had been closely concerned with his affairs. He collected these 20,000 tomans in the course of twelve days, by mingling gold, silver jewels and pearls and weighing them together, valuing them at the rate of only 1,000 *dinars* per *mithqal*.

68. The Dutch (Valandiz) chief¹ had to pay a fine to Maḥmud and also make him presents. On the capture of Iṣfahan, he took goods to the value of 6,000 tomans as gifts. During the siege of the city, the ex-Shah had borrowed from the Dutch the sum of 55,000 tomans, and had lodged with them (as security) jewels to the value of 25,000.² After he had occupied the city, Maḥmud discovered that jewels to this value had been lodged with them by the ex-Shah. He seized these (jewels) and informed them that he would pay for them, but he did not pay the 17,000 tomans (*sic*).³ Maḥmud demanded the sum of 20,000 tomans from the Dutch on the pretext of a loan. They bargained with Maḥmud's secretary and with great difficulty reduced the amount to 8,000 tomans, which they paid. He (Maḥmud) subsequently demanded 30,000 tomans more, but this they did not pay. They seized the captain⁴ and beat him, placed guards at their gate, and extorted 20,000 tomans; (then) they imprisoned them until the rest of the 30,000 tomans was paid. The aggregate fines paid amounted to 61,000 tomans, and the grand total of all payments was 176,000 tomans.⁵

69. From the English (*Ingliz*) agent (*sarkar*) they levied as a fine the sum of 4,000 tomans in cash, and took 50 bales of

¹ His name was Nicolaus Schorer. The term used for 'Agent' in the text is *sarkar* or 'commander'. He actually held the rank of Chief Merchant. (L. L.).

² These figures are too high. The aggregate amount that the Dutch had advanced to Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain and had to pay to Maḥmud did not exceed 40,000 tomans in all. See H. Dunlop, *Perzië Voorheen en Thans* (Haarlem, 1912), p. 258. (L. L.).

³ This means apparently that Maḥmud not only reduced the valuation of these jewels from 25,000 tomans to 17,000, but also failed to make any payment at all for them.

⁴ This was presumably Nicolaus Schorer. (L. L.).

⁵ This figure is grossly exaggerated; see note 2 above.

broad cloth and thick woollen fabric (*kiffi chokha*)¹ worth 3,000 tomans, making a total of 7,000 tomans for the two items.²

70. From the French (*Franksuzi*) Captain they took 60 tomans as a fine.³

71. Hajji Nazar, of Shiraz, had fled from Işfahan. They (the Afghans) opened his shop and confiscated all its contents, namely, cash and goods to the value of 6,000 tomans.

In this way, the total amount of Maḥmud's extortions in cash and goods, as related in sections 65 to 71, is 189 *sekotz*⁴ tomans.

72. Fines were also levied on all those persons of means who had remained in the city; some people paid from 50 to 1,000 tomans each. In this way too they extorted an enormous sum of money.

73. Maḥmud had the shops (*hujreh*) of all the Muḥammadans who had died or had fled opened. These shops contained a great many goods all of which he confiscated.

74. Once again he (Maḥmud) levied a fine on the town (Işfahan) as well as on Julfa. He demanded from the town:

2,000 pieces (*tup*) of gold cloth (*zar-baf*) made in Işfahan, Kashan and Yazd.

200 pieces (*tup*) of gold brocade (*diba-yi-zar*), with gold and silver background.

150 gold turban-cloth (*zar-mandil*) manufactured in Patna (India).

¹ I have been told that broad cloth in Turkey was called *chokha*; *kiffi* may be a misprint or corruption of Kiev.

² The records of the English East India Company give no precise figure, it being merely stated that it had to pay much less than the Dutch. According to Clairac, vol. II, p. 73, the English Company had to pay 12,500 tomans, partly in cash and partly in goods. (L. L.)

³ He was Ange de Gardane, the Chevalier de Saint-Croix. According to Clairac, vol. II, p. 72, the French paid only 30 tomans «qui furent employés à la cuisine du Grand General Aman-Ola». (L. L.)

⁴ The meaning of the term *sekotz* is obscure. It may be a corruption of the Armenian *voskotz* ('of gold') or of the Arabic (and Persian) word *sikka*, meaning coined or minted money.

As the town was ruined, they could not deliver the first two items and only half of the rest.

The Armenians of Julfa delivered 5,000 long satin coats, cotton (*ghutni*) material, broad-cloth and woollen shawls. They handed over sufficient material (*chokha*) to make up 8,000 long coats for their soldiers. The Armenians also delivered a number of good quilts, mattresses and pillows, all of which were of gold (*zar*) and textiles (*qumash*).

75. Maḥmud became very proud and haughty because he had amassed such vast wealth, and his treasury grew larger and larger day by day. He considered himself so great that there was (he thought) no one on earth greater than he was.

76. Maḥmud sent treasure to Qandahar on three occasions, first with Nur Muḥammad, secondly with Aqa Musa, and thirdly with Muḥammad Niṣhān.¹ He sent 60 young Armenians with the above-named Aqa Musa (as guards) in order to look after the treasure, and also to prove to the Qandaharis that he had really captured Iṣfahan. But his real object in sending these treasures to Qandahar was to raise more troops and to bring whole families with their children to Iṣfahan, although it was certain that 14,000 Afghan troops would be coming in the autumn under Muḥammad Niṣhān to march against Hamadan and Qazvin. Shortly before, the children of Naṣrullah Kōr Sultān and 1,200 Afghan families had arrived in Iṣfahan from Sistan.

77. The ex-Shah had built a fort at Gaz² which Maḥmud had unsuccessfully attacked on many occasions. Recently, the Zoroastrians went to Gaz, undermined the walls and demolished them, and then captured the village, killing all the men and bringing their wives and daughters and goods to the city of Iṣfahan.³

¹ As already explained, Muḥammad Niṣhān was Maḥmud's Chief Justice; it has not been possible to identify Nur Muḥammad or Aqa Musa. (L. L.).

² Gaz is a large village 11 miles north-north-west of Iṣfahan. (L. L.).

³ The Zoroastrians allied themselves with the Afghans because they had been so persecuted by the Shi'i Persians. (L. L.).

78. The Afghans were unable to take the villages of Khizun and Ben Işfahan,¹ as (the inhabitants of) these two villages bitterly opposed them. Eventually, however, they realised that there was no means of attaining freedom, so they came to the Afghans and voluntarily placed themselves under their rule.

79. The Afghans were much afraid of the Georgians, of whose might they had had experience before. Maḥmud said to the Georgians in his service: «Write to the men in your country, and tell them not to advance against us, for if they do, we shall kill you all.»

80. Maḥmud's intention is to occupy all the Persian territory and rule over it himself. He does not intend to plunder the country and then withdraw to Qandahar. As the country is now in turmoil and disorder, there is no justice for anyone and no one thinks of it. Maḥmud's intention was to crush his enemy and to make him live in dread of him, and it is thought that, after he has achieved his aim, he may establish justice in the country.

81. At the present time Maḥmud has the following forces:

	Men
Afghans, true	6,000
Persian musketeers (<i>tufangchis</i>)	2,000
Zoroastrians	1,000
Armenian musketeers	600
Georgians	30
Turks (<i>Ozmantzi</i>)	60
Multanis	50

The above seven groups of various nationalities total 9,740 men. The Persians, Armenians and Georgians did not join the *qullar* voluntarily; they had no wish to join the army, but they were subjected to such torture that, being made desperate, they

¹ The villages of Khizun and Ben Işfahan (or Varnisfardaran), together with Furushan, an adjoining village, subsequently coalesced to form one large village which was known as Seh-deh ('three villages'). Seh-deh has recently been renamed Humayunshahr; it is $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles west by north of Işfahan. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

were obliged to enlist as *qullar*: Mahmud exercised a rigid control and strong influence over his army; anything he said or any order that he issued, was obeyed at once, and whenever he ordered them to rise, they rose immediately.

82. Mahmud had given orders that each of his troops was to obtain provisions for himself for four years. They did so for four years, of which one year had now passed. He himself also had plenty of provisions and has stored all these in the citadel of the town. Like other monarchs, he had servants who belonged to religions other than his own; to these he did not issue rations regularly, but gave them provisions only occasionally. He gave no pay (*donluq*) to his Afghan troops, because he left them free to take whatever they could get. He had fixed a wage of 6 tomans *per annum* for those of his servants whom he had conscripted from men of other faiths, but he has paid them nothing as yet.

The townspeople did not like the Afghans, but they showed an outward liking for them; it was so also with the Persian chiefs. The actual fighting men, however, liked Mahmud, because he gave them many privileges. Previously, the ex-Shah had (forcibly) converted the Zoroastrians to Islam, but Mahmud now told them that they could return to their own religion, for this reason they wholeheartedly served him.¹

83. Mahmud advanced money to 400 people, giving them from 2 to 20 tomans each, charging interest at 200 *dinars* per month, in order that they might own shops and do business; the promissory notes (*sanad*) were made out in the name of Almasi, the son of the *Qullar-aqasi*, who sent out heralds to make it known that: «anyone who wanted money for opening shops and for trade should come and he would be given it.» People of means also each borrowed two or three tomans of the money thus offered in order to show that they were Mahmud's debtors and so avoid being troubled. Merchants borrowed even larger sums.

¹ Evidence of this was given by their capture of Gaz. The Zoroastrians had previously welcomed Mahmud when he reached Kirman in 1719; see my *Fall of the Safavi Dynasty and the Afghan Occupation of Persia*, p. III. (L. L.).

84. On the 19th/30th May Maḥmud arrested the Armenians, demanding the payment of the rest of the money due (from them). They replied: «We gave you all that we had; nothing is left for us. Where can we get the money to pay you when we do not even have enough to buy our daily bread? We did have a piece of bread before, but you have deprived us even of that, and now, once again, you do not leave us alone.» Maḥmud replied: «Why should an Armenian have money? Our soldiers, who are fighting men, must have the money. Armenians must be farmers and do the ploughing and sowing. The money, houses and furniture that you possess are not necessary for you.»

85. On the 1st/12th March, Maḥmud began to levy land tax (*maljehath*)¹ on the Armenians of Julfa and on those in villages, as well as on the Persian Muslim farmers, demanding from them payment for expenses at the same rate which they had previously paid to the ex-Shah.

86. Amanullah asked this Joseph: «What sort of men are these Russians? Are they Franks? If not, what are they?» He replied that their creeds differed, but that they were men like the Franks and that they had a great empire on the other side of the Sea of Gilan (the Caspian Sea). He further asked: «Have they many troops?» Joseph informed him that they could raise 200,000 men and that they were fierce fighters. Amanullah said: «Let us rest for a while and then we shall be able to think of dealing with your Franks too».

87. At the time when Joseph left Işfahan, the prices of provisions were as follows:

	Dinars
Bread, per <i>mann</i>	600
Rice, per <i>mann</i>	1,200
Melted butter per <i>mann</i>	4,000
Chickens, per head	700
Sugar, per <i>mann</i>	6,000

¹ The term used is a corruption of *mal wa jihat*, meaning ground rents or land tax.

Sugar had previously cost 12 tomans (120,000 dinars), but by this time it had dropped to 6,000 dinars; the reason for this was that imported sugar had been brought to Qumisha (now Shahreza) and had been stored there. When the war came to an end, they (the Afghans) occupied Qumisha and brought the sugar to the town; that is why it had become so cheap.

88. On the 9th/20th August, Voskan the son of Noorik, an Armenian of Hamadan, informed me: «While I was at Qazvin someone who had escaped from Işfahan and had arrived there said to me that English ships carrying 6,000 troops had reached the port,¹ and that these troops had now reached Shiraz.»

In 1723 on the 10th/21st August the Archimandrite Mekertich, the son of Nazar of Julfa, arrived in Resht from Tabriz. He also said that he had heard of the English at the port, and gave us the following information:²

89. On August 18th/29th 1722, the Pasha of Erzurum had intended to set out for Erivan, having previously despatched all his troops. On the very day that he had planned to leave Erzurum, orders came from the Sultan of Istanbul instructing him: «Do not go because the Persians have made peace with Mahmud, and the Russians have entered Persian territory.³ You must strengthen the fort.»

90. On the 15th/26th August a messenger from the Pasha to the Persian Armenians arrived there and asked: «What news have you from your country? Is it true that the Russians have come to your country and that they intend to advance in this direction?» We replied that we had heard no such news. On the 17th/28th of the same month, at the Pasha's orders, they

¹ The name of the port is not given, but it was presumably Bandar 'Abbas. No British troops were sent to any Persian port at that time. (L. L.).

² A redundant sentence has been omitted here. (L. L.).

³ This was a little premature as regards the Russian invasion. Peter the Great occupied Darband, the Persian frontier town, on the 30th August/10th September, 1722. See J. Bell's *Travels*, London, 1764, vol. II, p. 332. (L. L.).

collected 300 Armenians and Turks from among the inhabitants of Erzurum who repaired the damaged parts of the fortifications, making them secure.

91. On the 20th/31st August a courier (*chapar*) arrived from Trebizond. He said that several ships had arrived there from Istanbul bringing arms and ammunition (*jabba-khana*), and asked the Pasha (of Erzurum) to send animals and men to bring these from Trebizond to Erzurum.

92. The Pasha of Erzurum sent plenty of animals and men, and brought all the cannon, hand-grenades,¹ muskets, swords, bullets, gunpowder, spears, spades and sacks to Erzurum. When all the ammunition had arrived, the Pasha began to test it by firing the cannon and throwing the hand-grenades. Meanwhile, orders were given for the proceeds of the Erzurum customs to be paid to the Pasha so that he might obtain provisions and make toasted bread (*sukhari*).

93. By order of the Sultān the Pasha of Erzurum was appointed Commander-in-chief (*sar'askar*).^{*} He now had under his command seven Pashas, and the Beg of Bayazid was also under him. Written orders were sent to all of them to be ready to march to Qarş with their troops when he gave the order and to assemble there under his command.

94. The Lezgis² who had entered Persia and looted the country, wished to go to Erivan and plunder it too. The Pasha of Erzurum wrote to the Lezgis: «When you go to Erivan, you must not go and pillage the cathedral at Echmiadzin,³ because

¹ The Turkish word *kumbara*, meaning either a hand-grenade or a cannon-ball, is used here; to judge from the context, it has the former meaning here.

² The Lezgis were a very warlike and predatory people inhabiting part of Daghistān and northern Shirvān. As staunch Sunnis, they were very hostile to the Shi'i Persians. (L. L.).

³ The correct spelling of this name is Ejmiatzin, but Echmiadzin is the form in which the name is usually given in English. It is the chief religious centre of the Armenians.

that cathedral is ours.» The Pasha's intention was to occupy Erivan (himself) and to leave the cathedral untouched for the Turks, because he had received an order (*farman*) from the Sultan not to plunder the Echmiadzin cathedral when he occupied Erivan.¹ In the meantime this Pasha wrote to our Catholicos to inform him of the service which he had rendered, adding: «I have done you this good service, (so) send me 10,000 *marchils*.»² The Catholicos replied: «I am merely a man of prayer, from where can I (obtain and) send you 10,000 *marchils*?» In consequence of this, the Pasha treated our Catholicos severely and greatly frightened him.

95. The Pasha of Erzurum issued orders forbidding the export of wheat from Turkey to Persia, and wrote to the towns and villages all around³ to collect provisions and take them to Qars.

96. On the 8th/19th September I reached Qars, and saw that the Pasha of that town would not allow any wheat to be exported to Persia or give permission to anyone to go there. They were extremely busy collecting provisions. Our Catholicos, having to consecrate the chrism or holy oil on Holy Cross Day, had written to the Armenians in Qars inviting them to go on a pilgrimage to Echmiadzin. The Pasha had forbidden those Armenians who were Turkish subjects to go there, saying: «Your Catholicos has joined hands with the Russians and has brought them to Persia to attack us from there. Now, under the pretext

¹ According to Leo, *History of Armenia*, vol. III, p. 645, Seqbos who was one of the influential Armenians in Constantinople, had asked the Sultan to send this special *farman* to 'Abdullah, the Pasha of Erzurum.

² As *marchil* is not an Armenian word, I consulted Professor Jopson, of St. John's College, Cambridge, as to its probable provenance. He expressed the view that the word might be a corruption of 'mark'. As Professor Patkanov stated in a footnote on p. 92 of his Russian translation of Gilanentz's *Chronicle* that a *marchil* was equivalent in value to 60 kopeks in silver money (and therefore also approximately equivalent to a mark), Professor Jopson's suggestion appears to be well-founded. (L. L.).

³ Literally, 'of his cardinal points'.

of a pilgrimage, you want to go and pray in your cathedral for our destruction and your hapiness, but we shall not allow your Catholicos to do such things.»

97. On the 14th/25th September I reached Echmiadzin, and saw that the Persians were not allowing rice to be exported to Turkey. They argued: «Since you do not allow us to import wheat from your country, we, therefore, for our part, ban the export of rice to your country.»

98. In 1723, in the month of January, we heard at Echmiadzin that, by a *farman*, the Sultān of Istanbul had ordered the Pasha of Erzurum to go to Qarş with all the Pashas and their troops under his command. This army, marching out of Qarş, rebelled against the Pashas at the first stage, saying that they could not go further in the deep winter snow. The Pasha sent an urgent courier to report this fact to the Sultān who, in reply, ordered him: «Spare no expense; you must get to Qarş quickly.» They took plenty of shovels with them, and by clearing away the snow, all the troops reached Qarş. Columns from elsewhere had also been hastening there; in this way, a great number of troops were centred at Qarş.

99. The Pasha of Erzurum sent a messenger from Qarş to the Khan of Erivan to say to him: «You have opened the way for the Russians to enter your country and from there to attack us.» The Khan of Erivan replied: «What makes you think that we have opened the way for the Russians? They have a mighty king, who has come by means of his own strength. He would not have listened to us had we tried to stop him.»

100. On the 3rd/14th March the Pasha of Erzurum sent an envoy named Dervish Aqa¹ from Qarş to the Khan of Erivan. He came and stayed for one day at Echmiadzin. Our Catholicos asked him why he had come. He said: «Our sultan has written (ordering) me to come and demand (the cession of) Erivan,

¹ This man was possibly Mir-'alam Dervish Muḥammad Aqa whom the Sultan of Turkey sent to Shamaki in 1722 to invest the Sunni leader Ḥajji Da'ud as Governor of Shirvan. He was subsequently the Turkish representative on the Russo-Turkish Frontier Comission. (I. L.).

informing them that if they (i. e. the Persian authorities) surrender willingly, we must not do a penny worth of damage. If they do not, then we must not spare anyone, but massacre them all, young and old, plunder their property and occupy their country. That is the Sultān's command. Now I have come to claim all the province of Erivan. If they deliver it over willingly, well and good. If they do not, then I shall return, but the Persians will have much trouble from us. The reason why we want Erivan is to prevent the Russians coming to our country by this route. And in the meantime, Ḥasan Pasha of Baghdad has been ordered to go to Hamadan with his 12,000 men, so that Maḥmud also may not advance on Baghdad.»

101. On the 5th/16th March the envoy left Echmiadzin for Erivan where he remained for four weeks. Couriers used to go from there to Qarş and return every week, but no one knew what was going on between them (i. e. the Pasha of Erzurum and the Khan of Erivan), but we heard that two of the Erivan chieftains (*aqas*) had previously written to the Pasha of Erzurum to this effect: «Why have you been standing idle? You are Turks (Muslims) and so are we. It is better for us to be in your hands than in those of the Russians. Now is the time for you to come and occupy our town, and (so) prevent the Russians from entering (it).» We also heard that the envoy's demand for the cession of Erivan had been flatly rejected.

The envoy had said to them; «You have written to us to come. We have come in answer to your written invitation.» But he had not disclosed the names of those who had written the letter, which they had kept secret. The envoy went on to say to them: «You have no king.¹ This country belonged to us before.

¹ There was talk of a similar nature towards the close of 1723, after the Porte had heard of the conclusion of the Russo-Persian Treaty of the 12th/23rd September, of that year. At a conference between the Rais-Efendi and Nepluyev, the Russian Resident, the former maintained that, as there was no longer any king in Persia, that country belonged to Turkey. Nepluyev replied that there was a king, namely Tahmasp, who had legally inherited the throne from his father. The Rais-Efendi retorted that Tahmasp could not be the legal sovereign, as his father was still alive. See Soloviev's *Istoriya Rossii*, vol. XVIII, p. 69. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

Give it back to us now so that the Russians may not come and take it over, destroy and be a menace to us. You and we are Turks (Muslims). Why should we fall unnecessarily into the hands of the infidels?»

The Persians thus replied:

«Thanks to God we have a king. He is reigning in Tabriz as sovereign.» (To this) the envoy replied: «Ḥasan Pasha of Baghdad has written that Mahmud has captured the Shah; there is no other Shah; all that you say is untrue.» To this the Persians replied:

«Since you do not believe our statement that we have a king, let us each nominate a man and send them together to Tabriz to see (for themselves) and (then) to report the result to us, in order that you may believe that we have a king.» They (accordingly) sent these two men to Tabriz, who saw that there was a reigning Shah there. They returned and informed the envoy of what they had seen.¹ The envoy believed them. On the 1st/12th April, he left Erivan and arrived at Echmiadzin on the same day.

102. On the 2nd/13th April, the envoy said to our Catholicos: «I went to Erivan, where I stayed for four weeks and talked a great deal to the Erivanis, but they did not listen to me, and they will regret it. We too do not listen to them, and by the end of this month or at the beginning of May, we shall come and occupy the country and do great harm to them.» Furthermore, he addressed our Catholicos sternly: «You also are very guilty, because you have sided with the Russians, sponsored and collected so many Armenians, numbering, they say, 60,000 armed men, who are all under your command. You will also suffer greatly, because you intend to bring the Russians to our country through your own.» The Catholicos answered: «I am a simple churchman, residing in my monastery. I have nothing to do with the affairs of kings. All that you have heard are insinuations and are untrue, if you believe me. If you do not believe me, well, then let be what God wills.» The envoy left Echmiadzin on the 4th/15th April for Qarş.

¹ In the interests of brevity, some superfluous words have been omitted here.

103. The unrest in Turkey is due to the fact that the Russians have entered Persia and that the Turks are afraid that they may, by stratagem or device, march through Persia to Turkey. It is for this reason that Turkey is fortifying all her frontiers with Persia, and is establishing military posts there to prevent any sudden invasion by Russia.

104. Muḥammad Quli Khan, the *Vali* of Kakheti, in Georgia,¹ has been given the khanate of Erivan; he is quartered in Kakheti, but his Deputy is stationed in Erivan. As our Catholicos is in alliance with the Armenian troops, they have often been in secret correspondance with each other. One of the Catholicos's letters had fallen into enemy hands and had been delivered to the Deputy in Erivan; he summoned the Catholicos and said to him: «You have also abandoned us! This is the letter which you have written to the Armenian troops.» He answered: «I did not write that letter. It is a forgery by an enemy.» The Deputy subjected him to much ill-treatment, and forced him to pay a fine of 4,000 Turkish pounds in gold² and detained him for a few days. After mediators had intervened, he was set free.

105. The Deputy Governor of Erivan summoned the Catholicos some days later and said: «Your Armenian soldiers have killed several Muslims and intend to advance on Erivan. You must write and tell them not to come to this country and not to touch any of our men.» The Catholicos answered: «I shall not refrain from writing such a letter, but I do not think that they will listen to me.» The Deputy Governor replied: «You are the head of all the Armenians, who always listen to you, why is it that they will not listen to you now? You must write.»

After much pressure, the Catholicos was obliged to write a false³ letter, purporting to say that the Erivanis were their friends, that they must not harm them, and that they must not

¹ Constantine III, to give him his Christian name. See note 1 on p. 3.

² Leo, *op. cit.*, vol. III, p. 624, using other sources, gives this amount as 700 tomans.

³ The word used here is *mahila*, from the Arabic *hila*, meaning a fraud or trick.

invade and ruin the country. At the end of the letter, he added: «You must follow your own best judgement and do what is good for you. You must act according to your own judgment.» This letter was sent to the Armenian army by means of an Armenian courier.

106. The courier took the letter and delivered it to the commander of the Armenian army. He wrote a reply and sent it to the Deputy Governor and chiefs of Erivan in the following terms:

«We wished to advance against you. However, because our Catholicos has written to us that you are our friends, that we must not harm you, and that we must not advance any further, for his sake, we have not done so, and we have now gone back. Now, as we have adopted this forbearing attitude, you also must do no harm to our Catholicos or to all his monasteries, monks and your local Armenians, and must treat them with proper consideration and respect.»

107. As news was continually reaching the Deputy Governor of Erivan that the Armenians were daily killing more and more Turks (Muslims), he again summoned the Catholicos, and said: «Your Armenians have been killing more Turks. You have written your letter in a false manner. We do not believe you any longer, and we shall not forgive you for that.»

108. The Turkish Governor at Bayazid had received word that the Russians had occupied Erivan and had sent an envoy to Echmiadzin, who is (now) quartered there. This Governor, through fear, sent a messenger to our Catholicos at Echmiadzin in order to verify this information. He said to the Catholicos: «The Governor sends his greetings and requests that, when the Russians come, you must not allow them to do us any harm. I and my people (*il*) will become Armenians¹ and belong to your flock.» To this (message) the Catholicos replied that the Russians

¹ The Governor meant by this that he and his people would become Christians.

had not come to his country and that he had not heard that they were coming in that direction. He had heard nothing of the news that the Governor had received. As regards the Governor becoming a Christian, he was to be told that if he wished to do that through fear of the Russians, he (the Catholicos) neither knew anything regarding their actions nor had he heard anything from them. The Turks, by means of this trick, had intended to lay bare the secrets of our Catholicos and to throw the poor Armenian nation into the fire and so destroy it.

109. The (Deputy) Governor of Erivan summoned the Catholicos and said that the Khan (of Erivan) had written saying that he (the Catholicos) must go to him. The Catholicos replied: «I am a churchman (*kardatzog*)¹ and have no business with the Khan.» The Deputy Governor insisted that he must go. The Catholicos replied: «If that is so, then I shall go, but how can I leave my house and my monastery alone? If I leave here, my monks and my religious community will be terror-stricken and will disperse. My monastery and congregation will (thus) suffer great injury, and there will be serious unrest in our army which neither the Shah nor the Khan would desire.» The Deputy Governor answered: «There is no need to speak too much. You must go! The reason why you have been summoned by the Khan, according to his letter, is that he wishes you to mediate between him and Wakhtang Khan, and effect a reconciliation.»² On three occasions the Deputy Governor had summoned and conversed

¹ The literal meaning of this Armenian word is «reader». In those days scarcely any books other than religious works were read, and those who could read were almost invariably churchmen. Thus, *kardatzog* came to mean «man of prayer» or «churchman».

² Georgia was by this time in a state of chaos owing to (i) the perturbation caused by the Russian invasion of Persia, (ii) the strife between Wakhtang of Kartli and the renegade Constantine (Muhammad Quli Khan), of Kakheti, (iii) raids by the Lezgis, and (iv) a bad outbreak of plague. Wakhtang had been antagonised by the refusal of Shah Sultān Husain to allow him to crush the Lezgis when he had it in his power to do so; Tahmasp, like his unfortunate father, being ever-ready to listen to bad advice, had supported Constantine instead of Wakhtang. (I. I.).

with the Catholicos in regard to this matter; he finally said to him: «Go and prepare for your departure and be ready (to go). On your behalf I shall write to the Khan to inform him that you are ready to go to him, but that, since your presence here is necessary for us, he should, if possible, allow you to remain here with us.»

110. A few days later the Deputy Governor sent for the Catholicos and said: «There is no way out. You *must* go. A letter has been received from the Khan today in which he said that he is offended with you, and adding: «Why is he delaying? (His presence) is necessary to me. Send that man at once. I wish him to reconcile me with Wakhtang Khan.» As he was helpless, the Catholicos was obliged to agree to go, but asked the Deputy Governor's permission to go back to the cathedral to put matters in order, return (to Erivan) and (then) go to the Khan. He was given permission (to do so), but he was reminded that he must soon return. Had the Catholicos refused to go, they would have caused all manner of trouble and would have inflicted severe injury. He went back to Echmiadzin, safely hid away all the valuables of the cathedral, lest, which God forbid, anything happened and they should fall into the hands of the tyrannous enemy. He issued the necessary orders and instructions in regard to religious matters, and returned to Erivan after an absence of two days, taking with him Hovanes, the Vardapet of Sari, who was his Vicar-General, and a few monks. Going to the Deputy Governor, he informed him that he was ready to go. He left the cathedral with deep sorrow and lamentations.

111. Six days after the Catholicos had left Erivan, the troops of the Deputy Governor went to Echmiadzin by night and occupied the cathedral and the houses of the village.¹ They remained there for six days, causing much damage to both the cathedral and the village. We asked them what their object was. They informed us that their purpose was to advance on the Kurds

¹ This village, which is in close proximity to the cathedral of Echmiadzin, is called Vagharshapat.

from there, but they lied, because we heard from one of them, a Turk, that our Catholicos, while on his way to the Khan, had written to Wakhtang Khan saying: «They are taking me to Muḥammad Quli Khan. You should rise and go there (too).» They had seized this letter and had brought it to the Deputy Governor at Erivan, who, after it had been read to him and learnt its contents, summoned a council. It was (there) decided that it was an ill-omened letter and that they should march to Echmiadzin, massacre all the Armenians and seize all their possessions.

112. While he was on his way, the Catholicos heard that his letter had fallen into the hands of the Deputy Governor. He at once wrote to him, saying: «Why have you seized my letter? It is true that I wrote to Wakhtang Khan to come. Why did you send me to the Khan if I had not been obliged to write such a letter?»

On receiving this letter, the Deputy Governor came to Echmiadzin. He had a consultation (with his advisers) in the cathedral, where it was decided that they must not touch the Armenians at that time, but should wait until they received word from Muḥammad Quli Khan. If the Catholicos would go to him, well and good, but if, on the other hand, he should go to Wakhtang Khan or to the Armenian army, then they would massacre the Armenians and plunder their property. The Deputy Governor then summoned us (the Armenians) saying: «Do not be afraid, as we are not going to do you any harm.» On the seventh day the Deputy Governor went back to Erivan with his troops. They had not robbed us, but they had involved both the cathedral and the village in much expense.

113. A few days later, Muḥammad Quli Khan wrote from Kahketi to the Deputy Governor stating that the Catholicos had arrived there and that he was with him. He (the Deputy Governor) must not maltreat the people of Echmiadzin or rob the cathedral, but must take good care of them.

114. Athamshen, the son of Papon, who is Muḥammad Quli Khan's treasurer (*sandugdar*), came from Kahketi to Erivan

and said to us: «Muhammad Quli Khan sent me to the commander¹ of the Armenian army as an envoy, with instructions to state on his behalf: 'Why are you taking such action? Come and obey me. I shall give you all that you want, dignity, money and country. I shall fulfil all your aims, only you must come and submit to me and listen to my words.» The commander of the Armenian army answered as follows: «We require neither dignity, nor money nor country. We want nothing from you and we do not recognise you. We have been gathering here for the great King-Emperor;² we are his servants, and we look forward to him (*i. e.* to his coming). If, which God forbid, he does not come to this country, or if he does not write and arrange anything for us and forgets his unhappy servants, we should then disperse and go to our homes. Let not Muhammad Quli Khan imagine that we shall submit to him.»

115. Athamshen had returned to Kakheti and had communicated the Armenians' reply to Muhammad Quli Khan, who became furious and summoned troops from Erivan. These troops, together with the Kakhetian forces, advanced on the Armenian

¹ This leader was presumably David Beg, a nephew of Melik Parsadan of Hallitzor in Qapan. He was a gallant and vigorous leader, endowed with great ability in both military and political affairs. He had joined the Armenian national movement, and had St. Jacob's abbey as his chief centre. He won a number of battles in the course of the struggle, which lasted for some years. For an account of his exploits, see Stepanos Shahumian, *Histoire choisie de Davith-Beg, de Combats des Arméniens de Khapan contre les Turks, ayant eu lieu de notre temps* (translated into French by M. F. Brosset and included by him in his *Collection d'Historiens Arméniens* (St. Petersburg, 1876), vol. II, pp. 221-256. The Armenian text was published in Vagarshapat in 1871. The Armenian writer Raffi published a historical novel entitled *David Beg* in Tiflis in 1882. Furthermore, the Armenian historian Leo has given an extensive and accurate account of his achievements which is based on historical data. Leo has shown him to be a more important figure than other writers have done (see his *History of Armenia*, vol. III, pp. 667-695). Some material on the history of David Beg was published in the periodical *Ararat* in 1905 (see P. T. Arutunian, *op. cit.*, p. 288). The Armenians still regard David Beg as a national hero. He died in 1728. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

² Presumably Peter the Great.

army. They were, however, unsuccessful, as a number of them were killed, while others fled to the Geghagoon country,¹ where they slaughtered over 2,000 Armenians, old and young, men, women and even sucklings, and they carried away many women, children and goods to Erivan. These soldiers, who had ravaged Geghagoon, on reaching Erivan informed the Deputy Governor of all their misadventures. When the Deputy Governor and the Erivan Muslims heard that the Armenian army had defeated their own forces, they, in revenge, attacked the Armenians both in the villages and in the town; they (also) began to rob and plunder, dragging away women and children and killing the men. The consequence was that the unhappy Armenians were unable to go out of their houses in the day time, and were subjected to much misery and torture. These Armenians, and even whole villages of them, seeing their misery and wretchedness increase day by day, apparently to a limitless extent, left their homes, and taking their families with them, escaped to Turkey.

116. The above-named Athamshen also stated that Muḥammad Quli Khan had sent a messenger to Wakhtang Khan to inquire: «What are your intentions? Come and let us be reconciled, (let us) unite like brothers, retain our country and also help the Shah, because he is also unfortunate. I should also like to know what is in your mind. What do you want and what is your creed? Let me know, so that I may follow suit. If you are a Muḥammadan, I shall be so too; if you are a Christian, I shall likewise be a Christian. What is your intention? Pray, tell me.» Wakhtang Khan replied as follows: «I shall not be reconciled with you, and I do not believe what you say. It is not for you to ask what my intentions and desires are. I am fully convinced by the object which I am pursuing, and, with the help of God, I shall deal with you too.» That was the answer which he sent to Muḥammad Quli Khan.

¹ Geghagoon («beautifully coloured») or Geghaygooni, from *gegh*, «beautiful», and *ayg*, «sunrise», meaning «with a beautiful sunrise», was at various times the name given to the country round Lake Sevan and the district to the west and south-west of it; it is now called Novoi-Bayazid.

117. On hearing the above reply, Muḥammad Quli Khan marched with his army against Wakhtang. He was tricked and defeated, and so retreated, but he wrote to Erivan saying: «I have pressed Wakhtang Khan hard, (but) send me (more) troops.» He also asked for some prominent chieftains (*aqas*) to be sent to him. These chieftains went with their men to the Khan in Kakheti. For the second time they attacked Wakhtang Khan, with their fresh troops, but they were again defeated and were forced to retreat.

118. Seeing that he could achieve nothing with his (own) army, Muḥammad Quli Khan went to the Lezgis and said to them: «Wakhtang Khan wishes to attack and destroy you. Come, let us join together and attack Wakhtang Khan.» The Lezgis agreed to this proposal and advanced jointly with him on Tiflis. However, I do not know yet what really happened there, as I have received differing accounts.¹

119. Muḥammad Quli Khan had been writing false reports to the Shah,² such as: «I have reduced Wakhtang Khan to great straits. I can send him to you either alive or beheaded, just as you please.» He frequently wrote such reports to the Shah. It eventually became clear to the Shah that he was lying, that all the couriers who were going to Tabriz from Muḥammad Quli Khan were kept there and that the Shah did not answer the letters to see finally whether they were true or not. Muḥammad

¹ Wakhtang was at first able to defeat Constantine, but when the latter combined with the Lezgis, he could get no help either from Russia or from Ṭahmasp, and was eventually defeated and driven out of Tiflis by his rival. In August, 1724, he was forced to escape to Russia, where he died some years later. See M. F. Brosset's *Notice sur les trois dernières années du règne de Wakhtang VI, d'après les documents des Archives de Moscou*, in the *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. II, part I, pp. 581-587. The contemporary Armenian historian, the Catholicos Esai Hasan Jalaliantz gives a good description of the occupation of Tiflis in his *Short History of the Aqvans* (in Armenian). Jerusalem, 1868, pp. 52-58. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

² I. e. Ṭahmasp.

Quli Khan continually wrote to the Shah that Wakhtang was his (the Shah's) enemy, that he had revolted against him, joined the Russians and become a Christian once more. He also wrote many other wicked things about him.

120. Since Wakhtang Khan came to know that Muḥammad Quli Khan had been writing harmful letters to the Shah about him, he also sent a courier to the Shah saying: «I am your friend and not an enemy of yours. All that has been written regarding myself is untrue;¹ you have made me Commander-in-Chief (*Sar'askar*) and have ordered me to advance against the Lezgis, but when I had made my preparations, collected my troops and left the town, you wrote to me not to march against them, but to turn back. I (therefore) turned back. The Lezgis, on seeing that I had done so, wrought great damage in my country, ravaging several villages and many districts, killing numbers of people, enslaving still more, and thus bringing ruin on us.»²

The Deputy Governor arrested the messenger when he reached Erivan, threw him into prison and seized the letter. He closed all the routes so that no one could convey information from Wakhtang Khan or let the Shah know the truth. Wakhtang's intention is to let the Shah know of his uprightness and to prove that he is not an enemy but a friend, but Muḥammad Quli Khan intercepts his letters and does not allow any of them or his men to reach the Shah.

121. Muḥammad Quli Khan had written to the Deputy Governor of Erivan: «All of Wakhtang's subjects whom you may find there, (whether) merchants or fighting men — rob the merchants and kill the soldiers.» On receiving this letter, the Deputy Governor arrested all Wakhtang Khan's subjects in Erivan and Echmiadzin and robbed them, and one of Wakhtang Khan's

¹ There was, however, a good deal of truth in Muḥammad Quli Khan's accusations. (L. L.).

² Actually, it was Tahmasp's father, Shah Sulṭān Ḥusain, who had ordered Wakhtang to refrain from attacking the Lezgis just when he was in a position to crush them. See note 2 on p. 51. (L. L.).

feudal squires (*thavad*),¹ whose name was Papon Beg,² had come from Akilig with 50 men and had passed through Erivan on his way to Tiflis. The Deputy Governor heard that Papon Beg and his 50 men had passed through Erivan, and immediately despatched 400 men in pursuit of them; they overtook them in the Babak valley which is 8 *farsakhs*³ from Erivan. Papon Beg with his men, while passing through this valley, were surrounded by the said 400 men. They had a long and fierce battle; finally they captured Papon Beg and 31 men, 15 having been killed while 4 had escaped. They had plenty of money and goods with them, all of which was seized and taken to Erivan with the prisoners; the latter were placed in prison there.

122. The Deputy Governor of Erivan is Georgian by origin. He is a treacherous enemy to the Turks and is not a friend. In Erivan there are only a few troops; most of the inhabitants have dispersed, having escaped to various places. The few local people and others who have remained here want the Shah, (while) others prefer the Turks (*Osmanlu*). There was no gunpowder in Erivan. As they wished to make it, they levied a tax of 50 *dinars* a head on the inhabitants in order to pay the wages of the gunpowder-makers.

123. When the Vardapet (Archimandrite) reached Tabriz, the Shah was there. He had sent Firidi (? Faridun) Khan with 2,500 men to Işfahan to fight the Afghans. 'Ali Mardan Khan,⁴ the *Vali* of Luristan, had at the same time sent his son with 50

¹ Thavad appears to be a loan word from Georgian. In that language *tavi* is «head» and *tavadi* means «one who stands out» or «one who is conspicuous». See W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, p. 246. (L. L.).

² The texte gives Papona Beg, which is incorrect.

³ About 26 miles.

⁴ 'Ali Mardan Khan was wounded at the battle of Gulnabad. He escaped from the field and was taken to his own country to recover from his wound. When well again, he wished to organise forces for the relief of Işfahan, but could not obtain sufficient support. Tahmasp would have been well advised to join forces with him instead of idling in Qazvin. (L. L.).

men to the Shah, to inform him: «You do not trust me and you do not consider me as a friend, (but) let my son be a hostage in your hands so that you may be assured of my loyalty, and grant me leave to go and fight against Maḥmud, but promise me only that you will not demand any money¹ from me.» The Shah wrote to 'Ali Mardan Khan: «Rise and march against Maḥmud. I do not want any money from you.»

124. The Kurds with 500 men went from Bayazid to Maku, and by a subtle device captured the citadel there. The Shah, on hearing this news, gave orders for 5,000 men to be collected and sent to Maku to recapture the citadel. When these troops approached Maku, the Kurds came out to meet them, saying: «As you have come in such great numbers, we and the citadel are both yours. Be at your ease and do not trouble yourselves needlessly.» The Persians were (thus) assured, and without taking any precautions camped and began to prepare their food, taking off their fighting equipment and resting in their under-garments (*alkhalokh*).² The Kurds, on seeing that they were sitting at their ease, suddenly drew their swords and attacked them. They killed many and the rest ran away. The Kurds seized all that they had. When this news reached Tabriz, the Shah thought no more about the citadel at Maku, and wanted only to behead the commander, but he paid a large sum to the Shah and saved his life.

125. On the 12th/23rd August Aywaz came from the town and said that Aqa Ḥusain had told him in the caravanserai: «A man who had come from Gaskar³ has said that some troops had arrived there and that Hadar⁴ Khan, of Astara, had sent a petition to the Shah (stating that) he could collect 12,000 troops, that is,

¹ The word used is *khazina*, meaning 'treasury' or 'treasure'.

² This type of under-garment, which is no longer in use, was worn under the *qaba* or long gown.

³ Gaskar is the district immediately to the south of the Murdab lagoon. At that time the chief town in it was Gurab-i-Gaskar. (L. L.).

⁴ This name is apparently a corruption of Ḥaidar. (L. L.).

8,000 men from Talish and 4,000 Persians, if the Shah would contribute one toman per head; they would go wherever he ordered or would destroy the Russians at his command. The Shah wrote in reply: «You are to be the commander (*sardar*); the revenue (*mudakhil*) of Resht is 12,000 tomans. You can collect it and give it to the Russians to satisfy them and make them leave Gilan. If the Russians do not take the 12,000 tomans and are unable to leave my country, then you can give those 12,000 tomans to your troops to go and fight the Russians and clear them, *nolens volens*, out of my country.»

126. On the 18th/29th August the deacon Markos, the son of Sahak of Hamadan, wrote to me (Petros) a letter from Gaskar stating that the Khan of Gaskar had collected 1500 men and was still gathering more, and that the same Khan had been appointed Governor-General of Gilan. He demands one man from every family in the whole of Gilan as conscripts for the war. Hadar Khan of Astara and the Vizier of Resht had reached Gaskar on the 15th/26th August. They had few troops, (only) some 200 musketeers, with them, but they say that there are more troops to come. And this Khan of Gaskar has stated in a council (*majlis*): «What can I do? The Shah does not allow me (to do anything). Otherwise I would make a sudden attack on the Russians during the night, crush them and disperse them.»¹ This news was brought to me by a friend who informed me what the Khan had said, and also pointed out what his intentions were. The Khan had summoned Markos and had asked him what the Russians had said to the Armenians, Markos replied: «I am not going to the Russians, but from what I hear from others they say that they are the friends of the Shah and that they have come

¹ The chronology is difficult to follow here, as we know from other sources that the Khans of Gaskar and Astara, together with the Governor of Gilan, raised a force of some 20,000 men early in 1723 with which they besieged the Russian commander, Colonel Shipov and his men in their caravanserai on the outskirts of Resht on the 18th/29th March. The Russians made a sortie during the night, took the largely untrained Persian levies by surprise and routed them, despite the great disparity in numbers. (L. L.).

to help him at their own expense.»¹ He was also asked further: «Is it true that 30 of the Russians die every day, and that the Lieut. Colonel (*potpolkovnik*) of Piribazar has died and that the Brigadier is seriously ill?»² The deacon Markos had informed the Khan: «I have not heard such things; such news is false, and it has been conveyed to you by people who come to you and like to tell you what will please you.» Then the Khan said to Markos: «You do not know anything.»

On the 14th/25th August, the news arrived that seven ships had appeared and had passed Soklan, and it was confirmed that Baku had been taken by the Russians.³ There was then confusion among the people of Gaskar, and they sent all the women and children out of the town. In this town there are nine cannon, of which five are of brass (*thooj*) and the other four are of iron; one of the cannon is very long and is a good one. There are also four swivel-guns (*zanburak*). The Khan orders his men to parade every day. In this month of August a runner (*shaṭir*) came from Tabriz in five days who reported that the Shah had left Tabriz and had gone to Vaspinj⁴ which is 15 versts from there, and it is said that he intends to go on to Ardabil.

¹ This was in accordance with the wording of the manifesto which Peter the Great had distributed in Gilan and elsewhere when he was setting out on his Persian expedition. It was in Russian, Turkish and Persian; a German translation is given in the «Auszug aus dem Tage-Buche des ehemaligen Schif-Hauptmanns und jetzigen Geheimen Raths und Gouverneurs von Sibirien, Herrn Fedor Iwanowitsch Soimonow, von seiner Schiffahrt auf der Caspischeb See» in G. F. Müller's *Sammlung Russischer Geschichte*, vol. VII, pp. 215-220. (L. L.).

² It is quite true that right from the beginning of their occupation of Gilan and parts of the adjoining provinces the Russians lost large numbers of men from disease. Their troops, especially in Gilan, 'died like flies' (see Manstein's *Mémoires*, vol. I, p. 95). According to Butkov, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 191, the Russians lost between 130,000 and 200,000 men from disease during the period of their occupation of northern Persia. (L. L.).

³ This news was correct. The Russians under General Matyushkin captured Baku on the 25th July/5th August, 1723. (L. L.).

⁴ This is intended for Basmenj, a large village about 6½ miles to the east-south-east of Tabriz.

127. On the 18th/29th August Pirakamal (?Pir-i-Kamal) of Piribazar brought the news that a few thousand men from Gaskar are going to attack the Piribazar fort at night, as they have heard that all the Russians there are ill.¹

128. On the 20th/31st August, Muḥammad Quli Khan (Constantine III), in conjunction with the Lezgis, captured Tiflis.² The Lezgis took away with them many goods and slaves from the town. After they (had left), the Turks came and occupied it. They neither rob people nor make them slaves; they merely remain there. We have not heard the above news from one person only, but everyone who comes from there says the same thing. Wakhtang Khan has also escaped and gone to Bashachuq.³

129. On the same day, the news also arrived that the Turks have advanced and taken Erivan and that they have occupied (the country) as far as Nakhichivan. This last news has not yet been verified.⁴

130. News was also received on the same date that the Persians had advanced and entered Qapanistan.⁵ They had seized all the arms, instruments, gunpowder, bullets that the Armenians in Qapan had possessed. This information also has not yet been verified.

¹ Petros's chronology is again faulty here, as this attack was actually made on the night of the 18th/29th March, 1723. (L. L.).

² The correct date is the 8th May, 1723. The Lezgis behaved with their usual barbarity, causing great loss of life and much damage; see the Tsarevich Wakhusht's account in Brosset's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. II, part I, p. 118. (L. L.).

³ It has not been possible to identify this place. After Wakhtang had escaped from Tiflis, he appealed for help to the Turks and later joined them for a time. He soon, however, regretted this action and eventually sought asylum in Russia. (L. L.).

⁴ This news was incorrect. The Turks did not take Erivan until the 28th September, 1724. (L. L.).

⁵ Qapanistan (or Qapan) was the name given to the greater part of the present districts of Zangazur and Daralagaz, which are situated to the east of Nakhichivan and are close to the border of Qaradagh. It is fertile, mountainous country, with plenty of water, forests and extensive pastoral areas in the valleys. Hallitzor, where St. Jacob's Abbey was situated, was in this region.

131. On the above date, Haruthoon of Qapan arrived from Tabriz. He stated that an Armenian *yüz-bashi* named Qanlu Shaban had had a quarrel with the son of Melikbashi¹ of the village of Avetaran, in the district of Duzakh, (but that) they had been reconciled. Melikbashi's son invited Qanlu Shaban to a banquet of honour in his village. Shaban went to the banquet with 300 Armenians. Melikbashi's son had previously made the following arrangement with his villagers: He himself would take Qanlu Shaban and a few of his men to his own house, while his villagers would divide the remainder of Shaban's men amongst themselves, each taking 5 or 6 to his house. He had given orders that when they heard a gun fired, each man was to kill the guests in his house. In this way they murdered this poor newly-promoted Armenian *yüz-bashi* and his 300 men, almost in the same way as the Khivans had killed Bekovich.²

132. On the 21st August/1st September, Bijan, the son of Haruthoon, (who was) nicknamed Barakallah (and was) an Armenian from Tiflis, arrived from Tabriz. He said that a runner (*shaṭir*) had come from Tiflis bringing letters in which it was stated that, when the Turks were approaching Tiflis, Muḥammad Quli Khan, together with the (other) Muslims in the citadel, went out to welcome them and brought them into the town.³ The Turks occupied Tiflis and three days later imprisoned Muḥammad Quli Khan and shortly afterwards made Vandak's (*sic*)⁴ son Shahnavaz Khan, whom they had arrested, Governor

¹ Professor A. Abrahamian believes this name to be a misprint and that the correct reading should be 'Melik Baqi's son'; this view is supported by historical material that has recently been discovered. See his work (in Armenian) entitled: *A Page from the History of the Transcaucasian People and Armeno-Russian Relations*, Erivan, 1953, p. 42.

² Peter the Great had sent Prince Alexander Bekovich Cherkassky on an expedition to Transcaspia and Khiva in order to discover whether a safe trade route to India could be opened up through that region. After the Russians under Bekovich had defeated the forces of the Khan of Khiva, the latter feigned submission, lured Bekovich and many of his men into the town and then murdered them. (L. L.).

³ Compare the account given by Wakhusht in Brosset's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. II, part I, p. 123.

⁴ This is intended for Wakhtang.

of Tiflis.¹ This Shahnavaḡ Khan helped Muḡammad Quli Khan to escape. He had ordered a boat to wait on the river Kura, and Muḡammad Quli Khan was lowered down by a rope into the boat and (so) made his escape.²

The Turks ordered Shahnavaḡ Khan to put on Turkish dress and to wear a *qaiwuq* (turban). He said to them: «The Shah has sent me a princely crown (*taj-tumar*) to wear and you (now) order me to put on a turban.» He escaped by night and fled to Ossetia. Four Turkish Pashas with their troops set out to capture him. Shahnavaḡ Khan, with Ossetian troops, marched to meet them. Finding that the Turks were in a very unfavourable position, they attacked them, killing three pashas and many soldiers and capturing another pasha.³ Wakhtang Khan was also in Ossetia at that time; he had the *eristav*⁴ Giorgi strangled. Wakhtang also had the intention of collecting fresh troops and of advancing on Tiflis in order to expel the Turks from there. The above-named Bijan added that, while he was in Tabriz, a courier arriving from Ganja brought the news that the Lezgis had come and surrounded it.

133. Reverend Father, our poor and pitiful Armenian nation is being greatly oppressed. The Persians are plundering the district of Gogthan, and they are subjecting the inhabitants to such horrors as cannot be written down in words. I wish that I were dead, and had not heard such dreadful things. Qapan is also

¹ Wakhtang's son Bakar, or Shahnavaḡ Khan as he was known to the Persians, had been Governor of Kartli in 1716 and was raised to the rank of King in the following year. He held this position until his father was reinstated as King in 1719. The Turks, during their brief association with Bakar, gave him the title of Ibrahim Beg. (L. L.).

² See also Wakhusht in Brosset's *Histoire de la Géorgie*, vol. II, p. 123. (L. L.).

³ The account of this engagement is very exaggerated. The Turks eventually forced Bakar to seek refuge in Ossetia, whence he joined his father in Russia. (L. L.).

⁴ For an explanation of this Georgian term, see W. E. D. Allen, *A History of the Georgian People*, p. 187. Elsewhere in this text, this name is given as Gorki. According to the Catholicos Esai Jalaliantz, *A Short History of the Aqḡans*, p. 55, this man was the Eristav Kiorgi of Qaraqankhan. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

undoubtedly afflicted, as I have stated in section 130. It is the same in Erivan, where they strike terror into the Armenians and (the inmates of) their monasteries, who have been forced to address an appeal to Parsadan Beg, explaining their misery and imploring him to do something for them. Parsadan Beg has sent a petition to the Shah and has obtained a decree (*raqam*) from him, which he has sent to Erivan, in order that they may not trouble the Armenians there any more.

Our Armenian army, which, as they say, consists of 60,000 men in three divisions¹ and is stationed in three localities² is on the one hand looking forward to the Grace of God, and, on the other, is anxiously awaiting the arrival of the Great King.³ They are in great need of warm encouragement, and Your Grace must think of them, because all the Persians and Turks are after their blood; because of them (the Persians and Turks), the Armenians are in trouble and suffering everywhere.

Believe me, the Armenians are ruined for several reasons. For one thing, they say that they are bound to be massacred, because they are alleged to have wrecked this country by bringing the Russians into Persia, by taking the Afghans to Isfahan and by raising 60,000 Armenian soldiers to join the Russians and destroy Persia. Reverend Father, those Armenians who have gathered together have done so in the name of the Great King-Emperor. For Christ's sake, do think of them and take care of them; they have flocked together like lambs so that the wolf may not ravish them, because they are surrounded by the enemy on all four sides. I have written very little regarding our nation, but Your Grace will understand more (than what I have said). I have not sent (on) even one of the letters that you gave me, they are all with me. I am in a dilemma; if I am to send them, the roads are closed and our foes are numerous. If I do not send

¹ The term used is *polk*, which is the Russian word for a regiment; as a regiment is much too small a unit, the term «division» has been used instead. Some details of the Armenian army are given in Appendix II.

² These localities, which were known as *sequakhs*, «strong-holds», are described in Appendix I.

³ Peter the Great.

them, then what will happen? Your Grace handed them to me sealed. I have written to you several times to (ask you to) allow me to open them and to send on copies, keeping the originals with me; if, God forbid, one should get lost, the other would still be in our hands, but Your Grace has written nothing respecting them. On the 16th/27th August, 11 ships arrived from Astrakhan, (but) there was no letter from you. You have sent us here, but you do not write to us to let us know what our future is to be or what will be our final lot. We have come here, but up to the present they (the local Armenians) have done nothing. We are sitting here idle and our expenses are enormous. The expenses we regard as a sacrifice for Your Grace's safety, but you should write to us in order to console our hearts. For the sake of Christ and of your soul, do not forget us and think of taking some action on our behalf.

We are unfortunate people and have taken refuge with you as our master and protector. In these days, every Armenian or Muslim (Tatar) who comes from there and who is good for nothing and has not even the ability of an imposter is given from 20 to 30 tomans and sent here, and yet our hardships are ten times as great as theirs.¹

You are our master today. You must inform the chief and do something for us. We have no money; we had a few tomans, but these we have spent. What is the end to be? We can only trust in God, and be worthy of Your Grace's favour, so that you may make arrangements for us.

Aywaz's servant, who had stolen money from him and escaped, has been caught and all the money has been recovered. Recently, Aywaz applied to the Brigadier and the Colonel² for leave, on the grounds that his servant was in Astrakhan and that he had kept back his (Aywaz's) goods. Although he had been instructed either to bring the goods himself or to send them, he has done neither. Now he (Aywaz) has been given permission to sail from here to Baku by ship, and from there to go to Qalaqad.³

¹ The text is corrupt here, but the apparent meaning has been given.

² These were, respectively, General Levashov and Colonel Shipov.

³ Qalaqad. This is possibly intended for Qala'-yi-Azad ('Free Castle'); this place cannot be identified.

I believe that our chiefs here have written to you and to the Governor Artem Petrovich¹ to send back Aywaz as soon as possible.

Reverend Father, it is a pity that his servant has not sent the goods, because this woollen material (*begrast chokha*)² now costs 5,000 dinars, whereas it was usually 2,800 to 3,000 dinars per *gaz*.³

If his cloth (*chokha*) remains there this winter, he will suffer a loss of 77 tomans in Persian money. Also, he is a poor man who has been robbed, and they are three brothers with large families who have nothing left apart from these goods. His brothers have written to him from Shamakhi that they are in dire need there, and that they are doing weaving for their daily bread. Your Grace, I beseech you to take pity on Aywaz and help him, and send him back soon, so that he may not be thought a liar, which is creditable neither to him nor to us. By the grace of God, when Aywaz returns to us, please send with him few intelligent young men, because, although there are plenty of young men here, they are no good. And of the youths who had given their word to Aywaz not one is of the kind that we like. He will inform you personally about them. Further, the Armenians here are no help to us, because all of them weep and say that they have been robbed, that they are destitute and that they have nothing left with which to help us. There is also no hope from (anyone) elsewhere, as everyone has been robbed, the roads are closed and it is impossible to send letters. We are in a very difficult position, with no one to help us from anywhere and no one to console us. May the Holy Ghost gladden our aggrieved hearts . . . Allow me to add this as well. At the present time, those of our Armenians who had money have escaped to the Cau-

¹ Artemii Petrovich Volynsky, who was then Governor of Astrakhan. In 1715 Peter the Great had sent him on a diplomatic mission to Persia, and he had concluded a commercial treaty with that country in 1717. Peter had subsequently appointed him to Astrakhan in order to keep him informed regarding developments in Persia and to prepare the ground for the invasion of that country. (L. L.).

² This was imported woollen material.

³ The *gaz* was a unit which varied according to locality from 41 to 44 inches in length. (L. L.).

casus or have gone to Baghdad. Reverend Father, to write the truth, no help is to be expected from the people here, keep to the merchants where you are and get all that you expect to get from them, for there are no other people among the Armenians with more money.

Reverend Father, do not be offended with me or think that I have not sent you anything as a present for a long time. It is because the shops in the town have been closed, but now that they have been reopened, I shall, by the grace of God, buy all that is necessary and send it to you by ship. I am not sending anything with Aywaz, as he is leaving by a post vessel and they will not accept parcels. I trust that other ships will soon be coming by which I shall be able to send you what is necessary. I ask you to treat Avet and Simon with proper consideration and have compassion on us all. God is my witness that you cannot find servants and sons like us, and you are well aware that I am not lying. It is true that we have sometimes offended you through our ignorance, but you must not take that to heart, for we have been traders, buyers and sellers. It is 16 months today since we gave up our trade and we have no income at all, only expenses. We do not yet know what we are or what is going to become of us. It is a pity that all over Persia and Turkey we are spoken of as slaves of the King of the Russians. If, which God forbid, you do not give us some employment and we are discharged, we should not then be able to live in this country any more, for if they catch us they will kill us like dogs, not like men. We shall therefore be stranded in Russian (territory); those (of us) who have some means may live, but those who have none will have to beg from door to door for subsistence. We have put our trust in God and have relied on you, in the hope that you will not let us die, and now let your will be what it may.

I have asked you several times, and have written to Avet to let me have my account, since there is death for everyone, and he has gunpowder of which my share is one barrel. I hope that you have already sent it. If you have not done so, be so good as to send it, as we have no powder at all. You will, of course, hand over the gunpowder and lead to Aywaz for him to bring (here). I have also asked you to obtain a letter from the authorities concerned to the Brigadier (instructing him) to supply us with gunpowder if we need any.

The following is a list of our men:

Yeremia, the son of Qumbreh; Khalaf, the son of Murad;
Petros, the son of the Reverend Gaspar; Carapiet, the
son of Gregory; Letzi Stepan Yakovliev; Haruthoon,
the son of Menatzakan of Ganja; Bijan, the son of
Stepan; Mirza the son of Dzar; Hakob, the son of
Mirza; Stepan, the son of Gaspar; Stepan, the son
of Allahverdi; Shved Maxim Alexandrov.

And these twelve men kiss your hand. Ten of them I had brought with me; the other two were with Aywaz, who came to Qalaqad. Yeremia and Hakob are with me. Yeremia earnestly implores you to keep his son with you and to take care of his family. He specially kisses your hand. The Brigadier and the Colonel pay you their respects. Please remember me to Ginos's brother Gevorg. Aywaz will relate everything to you personally.

May God bestow a long life on you and spare us to have the pleasure of kissing your feet.

Your little and worthless servant,

Petros di Sarkis Gilanentz.

APPENDIX I.

The Seqnakhs.

The name Seqnakh *սղնախ* meaning 'a fortified place',¹ was given to certain strongholds of the Armenians in the remote and mountainous parts of their country. The best known of these strongholds was called the Great Seqnakh, which was probably situated in the Mrav mountains, near the Tartar river. Another, the Little Seqnakh, is believed to have been in the Kirs mountains to the west of south-west or the present town of Shusha (to which it gave its name). At the present time there is an Armenian village called Seqnakh on the slopes of the Kirs mountains, which is an obvious survival from the Little Seqnakh.²

The commander of the Armenian forces in the Little Seqnakh was named Avan Euzbashi,³ who may also have commanded the troops in the Great Seqnakh. It is probable that Shusha and the surrounding district belonged to him. His memory is preserved there to the present time, as a great rock in the valley to the south-east of Shusha is still called 'Avan's Rock'. At the foot

¹ *Seqnakh* is not an Armenian word; it is, in fact, of Turkish origin, having been derived from *signakh*, meaning 'shelter' or 'refuge'. In Ottoman Turkish the word occurs as *siġnak*, from *siġinmak*, 'to take shelter'. (L. L.).

² At the present time there is a town called Signakh in Kakheti, on the main road that connects Tiflis with Byelokani and Zakatali. According to the anonymous Persian work, the *Hudud al-'Alam* (edited and translated by Professor Minorsky, pp. 119 and 358), there was formerly a town called Su(gh)nakh in Kashgaria. (L. L.).

³ 'Avan' is an abbreviated form of Ovanes (John) in the Armenian dialect of Qarabagh. 'Euzbashi' is from the Turkish *yüz-bashi*, 'captain of a hundred'. (C. O. M. and L. L.).

of this rock are ruins that are known as 'palaces', in which it is said,¹ Avan used to live.

A third stronghold, which was not, however, known as a *seqnakh*, was situated further to the south, in the part of Qapan known as Little Qapan. In later times a fourth stronghold was established in the Ganja district for the defence of the Armenians in that area.

¹ Leo, *History of Armenia*, vol. III, p. 627 (on the authority of Archbishop Makar).

APPENDIX II.

The Armenian army.

In the autumn of 1729 an Armenian delegation headed by Tharkhan Euzbashi, a brother of Avan, arrived in St. Petersburg. On the 21st October Tharkhan was questioned at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in regard to the Armenian army. In reply, he gave the following information:¹

(i) The army was in four sections, whose commanders were Avan Euzbashi, himself (Tharkhan), Abraham, Ohan, Baghi and Avak.

(ii) In the Seqnakhs there were 30,000 Armenian troops; there were no farmers or merchants there.

(iii) Every soldier had his own weapons, namely, muskets, pistols, swords and daggers (*khanjar*), all of which were made locally.

(iv) The country round produced wheat, cotton, grapes and many other kinds of fruit; silk was also produced. In addition, there were iron, copper, tin and silver mines. Gunpowder was made locally, but there were no cannon, as there were no cannon-founders.

(v) Horses were of good local stock. For meat supplies there were bullocks, cows, sheep, etc., in ample quantities.

(vi) He (Tharkhan) and his companions had come to St. Petersburg to ask for help. They wanted Russian troops, together with artillery and clothing, to be sent to their country to assist them in their defence against the Turks; up to that time, the

¹ G. Ezov, *op. cit.*, pp. 444-446.

Armenians had withstood the Turks unaided; they had fought bravely and had killed many of them on a number of occasions. They were ready and willing to continue the struggle; but, being conscious of their weakness, they asked for reinforcements; if these were sent, they would furnish them with the necessary supplies.

(vii) The Armenians did not wish to go and settle in the territory which the Russians had taken from Persia.¹

¹ This statement requires some qualification. According to Butkov, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 62, Peter the Great encouraged Armenians to settle in Gilan, promising them that, if they went in sufficient numbers, he would transfer the Persian inhabitants to some other part of the country. In response, a certain number of Armenians settled in Gilan and also in those parts of Shirvan and Daghistan that were in Russian occupation. (L. L.).

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